Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited by Littlechild, Stephen C.
  
 
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics CWPE 0410 
  
 
 
Regulated and Merchant Interconnectors in 
Australia: SNI and Murraylink Revisited 
 
 
S. Littlechild 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
          
         
 
    
      Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
             Center for Energy and 
      
Environmental Policy Research 
 
CMI Working Paper 37 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Not to be quoted without permission 
 
 
 
 
         








 
        
         


    M	






      




 
CMI Working Paper  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
 1
 
Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia:  
SNI and Murraylink revisited 
 
Stephen Littlechild1,2 
13 January 2004  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors 
between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from 
the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court 
review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court 
decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for 
dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission 
companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would 
have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market 
participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia 
and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the 
construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in 
terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political 
context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take 
account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated 
interconnectors versus merchant interconnectors. 
 
Introduction 
 
How far can merchant transmission sensibly replace or supplement investment by a 
regulated transmission company? Proponents suggest that merchant transmission could 
play a significant role and that only where there are market failures should regulators 
look to rate-based projects. Sceptics tend to see market failure as overwhelming in this 
area.
3
 It is also suggested that experience with merchant interconnectors in Australia has 
not been successful and has delayed investment in efficient regulated interconnectors. 
 
Australian experience with regulated and merchant transmission lines has certainly been 
characterised by controversies, litigation and delayed investment in regulated 
transmission. For example, after a protracted process of appraisal, the National Electricity 
                                                 
1
 Honorary Professor, University of Birmingham Business School, and Principal Research Fellow, Judge 
Institute of Management, University of Cambridge. Email address sclittlechild@tanworth.mercianet.co.uk.  
I am particularly grateful to Robert Booth, and to many others including Greg Houston, Bruce Mountain, 
Hugh Outhred, Robert Outhred, Brian Wharmby and a referee, for information, comments and suggestions, 
but none of them should be held responsible for the views expressed herein. 
2
 The author was invited by TransEnergie and Murraylink to comment on part of the regulatory process in 
Australia in 2001, and was called by these companies to testify in the August 2002 hearing before the 
National Electricity Tribunal. Neither TransEnergie nor Murraylink has provided financial support for 
subsequent work or for the writing of this paper, and they are similarly not responsible for the views 
expressed herein. 
3
 Two leading papers are by Hogan 2003 and Joskow and Tirole 2003. For a fuller discussion of the 
literature see Littlechild 2003. 
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Market Management Company (NEMMCO) approved the proposed regulated 
interconnector SNI. The merchant interconnector Murraylink appealed this decision to 
the National Electricity Tribunal. Murraylink is now operational, but SNI was delayed 
and has so far not been implemented.  
 
How to evaluate this episode is another matter. I have argued elsewhere (Littlechild 
2003) that evidence from the Tribunal hearing showed that, once Murraylink was 
committed, to build SNI as a duplicate interconnector would be an inefficient rather than 
efficient use of resources. And whereas it is commonly suggested that merchant 
transmission could lead to insufficient investment, this episode suggested that regulated 
transmission is liable to produce excessive investment judged by conventional economic 
criteria. So it could be argued that the regulatory process was deficient rather than that 
merchant transmission was inherently unsatisfactory, and that in this particular case the 
litigation and delay to the regulated investment actually improved rather than reduced the 
efficient use of resources.  
 
However, this particular episode was only part of a long-running saga that even now is 
far from complete. What would a broader appraisal show? The present paper examines 
Australian experience with these two interconnectors in a number of further respects, 
including looking back at the earlier history and updating the analysis in the light of 
further experience. 
 
Part One of the paper presents some brief historical background. This makes the paper 
more self-contained and independent of the previous paper. It also provides a clearer 
picture of the political context in which policy in this area has developed. 
 
Part Two looks at the finding of the Victoria Supreme Court, published after the previous 
paper was written, in its judicial review of the Tribunal decision. The Court finding is 
important in a number of respects: it comments on the reasoning of the Majority and 
Minority Decisions of the Tribunal, it upholds in two key respects Murraylink’s appeal 
against the Tribunal decision, and it sets out guidance for how the incumbent 
transmission company and the regulator should act in future.  
 
The previous paper took as given the construction of the merchant interconnector 
Murraylink and looked only at whether the regulated interconnector SNI was economic 
thereafter as a duplicate interconnector. It did not look at the process over a longer period 
of time, to establish which (if either) of these interconnectors was efficient in the first 
place. Accordingly, Part Three of this paper does this. It looks back at the thinking and 
actions in the period before the NEMMCO appraisal – that is, when SNI was first 
proposed, before Murraylink was built. It examines whether all or any of the proposed or 
constructed interconnectors were economically or financially viable and would have 
passed the “regulatory test”. This appraisal is informed by the decision of Murraylink 
(subsequent to the previous paper) to accept a transfer from merchant to regulated status, 
and the associated report of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) on the costs and benefits of various relevant alternatives.  
 
Part Four examines the financial viability of the Queensland interconnectors, the 
suggested inefficiency of merchant relative to regulated interconnectors, and the 
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distributional implications of regulated interconnectors. It then examines the nature of the 
benefits assumed in the ACCC’s recent application of the regulatory test, and the 
proposal by ministers to change yet again the nature of the test. 
 
Part Five brings the results of the paper together. It argues the importance of recognising 
the different objectives of merchant and regulated investment in analysing and choosing 
the appropriate arrangements for transmission investments. 
 
PART ONE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE INTERCONNECTORS 
 
The historical background and political context 
 
Until the last few years, each Australian state government owned the electricity supply 
system in that state. These systems were developed independently, with only two 
relatively small interconnectors between them.4 There was little desire for further links.5 
The “split-savings” trading system between three vertically-integrated utilities sufficed 
until the concept of a national electricity grid arose in 1991.  
 
In 1994 Victoria decided to adopt the UK model of a trading system with a view to 
introducing privatisation, competition and regulation. To a greater or lesser degree, other 
states remained to be convinced. 
 
The building of further interconnectors was particularly controversial. One account 
suggests that the motivations of the governments in three relevant states may be 
summarised as follows.6 New South Wales was keen to promote further interconnectors – 
initially with Queensland and then with South Australia - in order to export its surplus 
generation. In Queensland, a taskforce, looking for it to join the NEM, restructure and 
privatise, proposed that the government should construct a large interconnection with 
NSW, focusing on northward flow ‘to discipline generators in Queensland’.7 South 
Australia, having suffered a blackout in 1993, put in place an import agreement for its 
existing interconnector with Victoria and was initially keen to construct a second one to 
NSW. However, when South Australia decided to privatise the sector it withdrew its 
support.8 
 
This account suggests that the decisions whether to construct – or not to construct, or to 
cancel the construction of – electricity interconnectors were essentially political as well 
                                                 
4
 The Snowy interconnector between NSW and Victoria was built in 1961, and the Heywood 
interconnector between Victoria and South Australia (SA) in 1989. The former line “was constructed not so 
much as an interconnection, but rather because the development of the Snowy Mountains [Hydroelectric] 
Scheme was paid for by the sale of electricity to each of these states.” (Booth 2003 ch. 2. p. 19) 
5
 Referring to the sometimes-heard description of Australia as “less of a nation and more like a series of 
warring tribes” (p. 13) Booth comments that “The ‘warring tribes’ have been very evident whenever 
‘linking up’ or interconnection has been suggested.” (p. 19).   
6
 Booth (2003). 
7
 In the event, Queensland did not privatise its electricity sector, new generation in Queensland lowered 
prices there, and the interconnectors often flowed southward. 
8
 “The advisers hired to manage the sale process informed the government that SANI would probably halve 
the value of the generation assets in the state if allowed to proceed. The South Australian government then 
withdrew its support for SANI and actively opposed it in all available fora.” Booth 2003, p. 89. 
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as economic in nature. State governments as owners of the state electricity systems made 
these decisions. The governments were variously driven by factors such as preferences 
for self-sufficiency rather than cooperation with other states, concerns about security of 
supply and actual or potential generation market power, ambitions to make profitable use 
of surplus capacity and to maximise proceeds of privatisation, and so on.  
 
No doubt the extent of government interest varied over time, and from one minister to 
another. No doubt the interests of the government-owned transmission entities were also 
influential. And it is not that political considerations do not have economic dimensions, 
or that no economic calculations or cost-benefit analyses of any kind were made (though 
not all were published). Rather, the decisions to build or not build these interconnectors, 
and the sizes to build them, seem to have been conceived in political terms at least as 
much as in economic terms, and politicians took important decisions.9  
 
The regulatory framework was changing, however. In 1996 the National Market 
Management Company (NEMMCO) and the National Electricity Code Administrator 
(NECA) were created.10 Moreover, the ACCC was considering how best to discharge its 
impending responsibility for regulating transmission revenues in the National Electricity 
Market (NEM), as provided for in the National Electricity Code (the Code). Part of that 
Code deals with the criteria under which transmission augmentations may become part of 
the regulated asset base of a Transmission Network Service Provider (TNSP) and earn a 
regulated return thereon. At that time the criteria were set out in a “Customer benefits 
test”, which “was designed to ensure that network investment would only be undertaken 
if customers benefited from that investment.”11 The Code also made explicit allowance 
for the existence, and indeed protection, of “entrepreneurial interconnectors” or what 
were later called Market Network Service Providers (MNSPs).12 
 
But as indicated above, not all the States were equally convinced of the new framework, 
and moved towards it at different speeds. Many states retain substantial degrees of 
government ownership, there is State regulation of retail and distribution price controls, 
and some States operate tariff equalisation mechanisms to insulate generators, retailers 
and customers from market signals in the NEM. An interesting question, therefore, was 
how far and how fast the traditional political framework within a state monopoly context 
would give way to a new economic framework within a national competitive context. 
Would the two frameworks conflict? 
                                                 
9
 See also contemporary political reports e.g. “The SA Government's backflip on the sale of ETSA and 
Optima saw it withdraw its one time support for the [interconnector] project (known as Riverlink or SANI) 
for fear of devaluing Optima. Equally NSW is hoping to improve the earnings and value of its power 
stations.” There is also reference to other considerations: “if SANI goes ahead the mooted gas-fired power 
station at Pelican Point will be shelved. That's bad news for jobs and investment in South Australia and 
terrible news for the environment.”   Inside Story, Australian Democrats Newsletter, December 1998, p. 3. 
10
 “The former was to become the short-term operator of the proposed National Electricity Market (soon 
called the “NEM”), and the latter was to take responsibility for a National Electricity Code (NEC, or “the 
Code”) and its initial authorisation/acceptance under the modified TPA and the approval of any subsequent 
modification.” Booth 2003 p. 193 
11
 ACCC Issues Paper - Review of the Regulatory Test, 10 May 2002 (henceforth ACCC Issues Paper), p. 2 
12
 The US term merchant transmission line was previously referred to in Australia as an entrepreneurial 
interconnector and is now called a market network service provider (MNSP). It will be convenient to use 
the term merchant interconnector here. 
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TransGrid and the SANI/SNI interconnector to South Australia  
 
The issue nearly came to a head in Queensland. In 1997, the NSW and Queensland 
governments announced and approved a new regulated line between those two states, 
called QNI.13 Because of its timing, QNI just avoided providing the first test of the 
potential tension between the political and economic frameworks for interconnector 
decisions.14 
 
In contrast to the situation in Queensland, the regulated and merchant interconnectors 
into SA became inextricably enmeshed in the regulatory framework, and there has been 
substantial conflict throughout. Both political and economic considerations have played 
an active role in the subsequent history of both interconnectors. The earlier history has 
been recounted elsewhere15. Here, it will be useful to set out in a little more detail the 
early history of the project.  
 
The SANI project and its successor SNI consisted of a 250MW AC interconnector 
between Buronga in NSW and Robertstown in SA, plus certain reinforcement work to the 
NSW transmission system. Figure 1.1 is a simple map of the SNI and Murraylink 
interconnectors.16 In 2001 the history of the project was summarised as follows.17 
 
The SA electricity system already has one interconnection with Victoria, which 
entered commercial service in 1990, and which is at full capacity. Over the 
summer period SA experiences electricity shortages and now requires additional 
electricity capacity.  
                                                 
13
 QNI is an overground alternating current (AC) interconnector that covers a distance of about 550 km and 
has a present transfer capability of 1000 MW south to NSW and 750 MW north to Queensland. It went into 
initial operation in February 2001. In parallel, in 1998 TransEnergie proposed DirectLink, a much shorter 
(65 km) underground high voltage direct current (HVDC) unregulated interconnector (i.e. a merchant 
transmission line) between the two states, with a smaller capacity of 180 MW.  TransEnergie is the 
transmission subsidiary of Hydro Quebec, a publicly owned electric utility company in Quebec. DirectLink 
began operation in June 2000.  See “Interconnection of the NSW and Queensland Electricity Grids, 
submission to the ACCC”, 24 September 1997, TransGrid (NSW), Powerlink Queensland, NSW Electricity 
Reform Taskforce and Queensland Electricity Reform Unit. “Applications for Authorisation, National 
Electricity Code”, ACCC, 10 December 1997. Other sources include FERC evidence of TransGrid and 
TransEnergie, and Gordon Jardine (CEO, Powerlink Queensland), “Regulated vs Non-Regulated 
Interconnectors … there is a case study!!!!” submission to the COAG Energy Markets Review, April 2002. 
See also Littlechild 2003. 
14
 “The Queensland interconnection project managed to gain the approval of the two state governments 
before the National Electricity Code took effect – which now can be seen as a merciful event, since, had the 
provisions of that Code been applied to that project, it is highly doubtful that it would have been approved 
and it would certainly have suffered years of delay.” Booth 2003 p. 88 
15
 Littlechild (2003). See also Mountain and Swier 2003, ACCC and NEMMCO publications, TransGrid 
annual reports, TransGrid and Murraylink FERC Comments 2002, and witness statements to the National 
Electricity Tribunal. 
16
 Source: IRPC Stage 1 Report, Proposed SNI Intereconnector, 26 October 2001 (pages dated 1 November 
2001), Figure 1.1 p. 8. At the end of this paper, Figure 1 shows Murraylink more explicitly (Source: ACCC 
Conversion Preliminary View). Figure 2 shows the extent of what later became known as Unbundled SNI 
(Source: Witness Statement of A S Cook, National Electricity Trinbunal, 14 May 2002). 
17
 Issues Paper, TransGrid SA NSW SNI (Central Route) Interconnector Proposal, Major Developments 
Panel, South Australia, December 2001, p. 7. (Present footnotes added.)  
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In September 1994, the Chief Executives of Pacific Power and ETSA Corporation 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to examine the feasibility of a direct 
interconnection between the electricity networks operated by their respective 
organisations. The technical and costing studies identified an option that appeared 
favourable from both technical and economic viewpoints. With the subsequent 
changes in industry structure in both states, the responsibility for this work in 
NSW was devolved to TransGrid18, and in SA to ETSA Transmission (now 
ElectraNet SA), a subsidiary of ETSA Corporation.19 This agreement culminated 
in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on 1st August 1996.20 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The State-owned Electricity Commission of New South Wales (ECNSW) was split into TransGrid 
responsible for the transmission network and system operation and control, and Pacific Power responsible 
for generation and some coal mines. Pacific Power was later subdivided into three separate generators that 
remain in the public sector. TransGrid is now the publicly owned Transmission Network Service Provider 
(TNSP) in NSW. 
19The State-owned Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA) was corporatised as ETSA Corporation then 
(in stages) split into four entities: Optima Energy (a generation company, subsequently subdivided into 
three components), ETSA Transmission later called ElectraNet SA (a transmission company), ETSA Power 
(a retailer) and ETSA Utilities (a distribution company). All these entities were subsequently privatized. 
20
 The 1996 Memorandum of Understanding was between Ministers, and referred to a feasibility report of 
the benefits of such an interconnector. In 1997 this report found that there would be benefits. “Independent 
review of interconnection of South Australia and New South Wales”, London Economics, December 1997. 
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In June 1998 the National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO), the organisation responsible for managing the implementation and 
operation of the National Electricity Market (NEM), determined that the 
Riverlink/SANI proposal did not satisfy the test to qualify for regulated status 
and, therefore, a regulated rate of return paid by customers. The SA Government 
accepted this decision and proceeded to investigate alternative means of 
delivering the additional electricity capacity required by South Australia prior to 
the summer of 2001. The SA Government did not believe that the Riverlink/SANI 
proposal would meet this required time frame and ETSA Corporation 
subsequently withdrew the application. 
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TransGrid nevertheless considers that the proposal is a viable development and 
consequently submitted [on 29 October 1998] a new application for a route south 
of the River Murray, known as the ‘SNI’.21 
 
Perhaps the proponents of SANI could have proceeded, as did the proponents of QNI, 
without submitting their project to NEMMCO for evaluation. However, “The objective 
was to ensure that the project was justified under the … Code and would enter the 
relevant regulated asset base.”22 
 
At the time that NEMMCO found that SANI did not pass the consumer benefits test, it 
also noted certain problems with the Code and the test. Following pressure from the 
NSW government, the ACCC was asked to review the consumer benefits test.23 The 
ACCC initiated a review of the criteria by the consultants Ernst & Young. 
 
Subsequent developments  
 
Subsequent developments have been treated at length elsewhere (Littlechild 2003) so 
may be summarised briefly.  
 
- In March 1999 Ernst & Young reported to the ACCC, recommending a change in 
the consumer benefits test.24 
- On 28 April 1999 Murraylink25 announced its intention to develop a merchant 
interconnector over a similar (but shorter) route to SNI. 
- On 30 July 1999 TransGrid requested NEMMCO to suspend consideration of SNI 
pending finalisation of the revised regulatory test. 
- On 15 December 1999, after a period of consultation, the ACCC published 
revised criteria for regulated transmision.26 Amongst other things, these changed 
the “Customer benefits test” to a “Regulatory test” based on net public benefits or 
market benefits instead of net customer benefits.27 
                                                 
21
 The section continues “This proposal was declared a Major Development by the Minister for Transport 
and Urban Planning on 27 January 2000. …in response to community opposition to the southern route, … 
TransGrid now proposes an alternative corridor that follows a route immediately north of the River 
Murray”. 
22
 ACCC Issues Paper p. 2 
23
 “Two issues emerged following NEMMCO’s rejection of the application for the proposed regulated 
South Australia - NSW interconnector: NEMMCO found the Customer benefits test to be highly volatile; 
and the NSW Government believed the test was deficient and placed it on the issues register, meaning the 
National Electricity Market (NEM) would not commence until the issue was resolved to their satisfaction”. 
ACCC Regulatory Test for New Interconnectors and Network Augmentations, 15 December 1999, 
Executive Summary. It has been argued that the original Code provisions (including the Test and the 
decision to allow MNSPs to co-exist in the NEM) proved to be quite unworkable and were urgently in need 
of revision, quite apart from any pressure from NSW. Booth 2003, ch. 14. esp. pp. 226-7. 
24
 Ernst & Young, “Review of the Assessment Criterion for New Interconnectors and Network 
Augmentation: Final Report to ACCC”, March 1999. 
25
 The term, variously written Murraylink or MurrayLink, commonly refers both to the link itself and also 
to Murraylink Transmission Company (MTC), an affiliate company of TransEnergie Australia established 
to manage and operate the Murraylink facilities. 
26
 ACCC, “Regulatory Test for New Interconnectors and Network Augmentations”. 15 December 1999 
27
 ACCC Issues Paper p. 2. See also Ernst & Young, “Review” para 1.1.2.  
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- On 6 March 2000 TransGrid requested NEMMCO to recommence evaluation of 
SNI. It also extended the work to be carried out under SNI, so that it now included 
an upgrade to the NSW/Snowy - Victoria interconnection. 
- In April 2001 Murraylink commenced construction along a similar route to SNI. 
- On 19 September 2001 the draft report of the IRPC recommended that SNI still 
did not satisfy the regulatory test. 
- In October 2001 TransGrid further revised SNI to include more transmission 
reinforcement works in NSW.  
- On 1 November 2001 the final report of NEMMCO’s Inter Regional Planning 
Committee (IRPC) recommended that SNI now satisfied the regulatory test. 
NEMMCO confirmed this in its Determination on 6 December 2001. 
- On 21 December 2001 Murraylink applied to the National Electricity Tribunal for 
a review of this decision. 
- In July 2002 Murraylink began commissioning and testing.  It entered commercial 
operation on 4 October 2002. 
- On 18 October 2002 Murraylink applied for conversion from merchant status to 
regulated status. The ACCC set in train a consultation process to consider 
Murraylink’s application28, which was contested by TransGrid and some other 
parties.  
- On 31 October 2002 the Tribunal upheld NEMMCO’s decision by a 2-1 
majority.29  
- On 28 November 2002 Murraylink secured a judicial review of the Tribunal’s 
decision, in the Victoria Supreme Court.  
- On 14 May 2003 the ACCC issued its Preliminary View, confirming that 
Murraylink could convert to regulated status and indicating that it would set the 
value of Murraylink’s regulatory asset base and allowed revenue based on an 
application of the regulatory test.30 
 
There have been at least three more recent developments31: 
 
- On 24 July 2003 the Victoria Supreme Court held in favour of the Tribunal on 
most grounds but in favour of Murraylink’s appeal on two quite fundamental 
grounds.32 It remitted the decision back to the Tribunal for reconsideration.  
                                                 
28
 Murraylink Transmission Company Application for Conversion and Maximum Allowed Revenue: 
Preliminary View, ACCC, 14 May 2003. 
29
 Reasons for Decision: The Hon Jerold Cripps QC (Chairperson) and Professor Douglas Williamson 
RFD, QC (Member) 31 October 2002 (henceforth Majority Decision). Reasons for Decision: Professor 
Gavan McDonell FTSE (Member) 31 October 2002 (henceforth Minority Decision). Application 1 of 2001. 
Available at www.netribunal.net.au. Ironically (in view of the later Court finding) both Majority members 
were lawyers. The Minority member said that he had expertise in engineering, economics and sociology.  
30
 Murraylink Transmission Company Application for Conversion and Maximum Allowed Revenue: 
Preliminary View, ACCC, 14 May 2003. 
31
 There is not space here to discuss another interesting development: the Basslink interconnector. This was 
proposed by the builder (a subsidiary of National Grid Company) as an unregulated interconnector but 
contracted to the Government-owned hydro-generator in Tasmania, hence it did not have to pass the 
regulatory test. 
32
 MurrayLink Transmission Company Pty Ltd v NEMMCO, [2003] VSC 265 
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- On 1 October 2003 the ACCC confirmed its approach to conversion of status and 
set a revenue cap.33 Murraylink accepted this proposal, relinquished its merchant 
status, and became a regulated network service provider as of 9 October 2003.    
- On 11 December 2003 the Ministerial Council on Energy, comprising the Federal 
and State Energy Ministers, agreed the creation of a new Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) to perform all national energy market regulation functions, and 
endorsed a package of reforms to electricity transmission regulation, including 
amendments to the Regulatory Test and the regulation of new interconnectors.34 It 
also proposed to abolish the National Electricity Tribunal. 
 
PART TWO THE VICTORIA SUPREME COURT DECISION 
 
Summary of the Tribunal’s decision 
 
In order to understand the Court’s decision it is necessary briefly to summarise the 
Tribunal’s decision.  
 
Following the ACCC’s reformulation in December 1999, the regulatory test says that “A 
new interconnector or transmission system augmentation satisfies this test if it maximises 
the net present value of the market benefit having regard to a number of alternative 
projects, timings and market development scenarios.” 
 
TransGrid argued that SNI satisfied this test. Murraylink argued that an alternative 
project that came to be called Unbundled SNI (or USNI), comprising the system 
reinforcement part of SNI without the actual interconnector, had a higher net present 
value. TransGrid argued that Unbundled SNI was not a practicable alternative because it 
was not commercially feasible. Murraylink did not accept this. 
 
To indicate the orders of magnitude involved, Table 1 summarises the numbers from the 
modelling put forward by TransGrid’s own consultants IES. Full SNI had a positive Net 
Benefit of (Australian)$166 m. Unbundled SNI (the network reinforcement component) 
accounted for just under half the costs and more than all the benefits35. Its Net Benefit 
was nearly twice that of full SNI. The incremental cost of the interconnector component 
accounted for just over half the costs and its incremental benefit was negative. 
Consequently, its incremental Net Benefit was significantly negative. Note that all these 
calculations assume that Murraylink is going ahead, so that the incremental costs and 
benefits refer to SNI as a duplicate interconnector (or at least a parallel one, since the two 
technologies are not precisely the same). 
 
                                                 
33
 Decision: Murraylink Transmission Company Application for Conversion and Maximum Allowed 
Revenue, File No M2002/468, ACCC, 1 October 2003. (Henceforth ACCC Conversion Decision) 
34
 Ministerial Council on Energy, Reform of Energy Markets: Report to the Council of Australian 
Governments (CoAG), 11 December 2003; also Communique, Perth, same date. 
35
 The reasons for the latter result were not explored or explained. Similarly for some of the surprising 
details - for example, that in several scenarios there was more generation new entry in SA if the 
interconnector SNI were built than if it were not. See Modelling the application of the regulatory test to 
SNI: A report to Clayton Utz, IES, 28 June 2002. Being the Witness Statement of Andrew James Campbell, 
28 June 2002, Appendix Exhibit 25. 
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Table 1 NPV Benefits and costs ($m) of SNI projects, Realistic Bidding scenario 2 
   Full SNI Unbundled SNI Interconnector SNI 
Benefits  264.5   351.4   -86.9 
Costs   -98.4   -41.2   -57.2 
Net Benefit  166.1   310.2   -144.1 
 
The precise numbers depend on the assumptions and scenarios used, but the general 
proposition was ultimately not in dispute. The Tribunal put it this way. 
 
The most significant issue in the proceedings was whether the Tribunal should 
have regard to USNI as an alternative project. It is common ground that USNI 
contributes a greater part of the net present value of SNI and if undertaken by 
itself would result in a higher rate of return than SNI. It is also common ground 
that acceptance of USNI as an alternative project would mean that SNI does not 
maximise net present value of market benefit.36 
 
TransGrid argued that USNI was not commercially feasible because it had no proponent. 
TransGrid was unwilling to be a proponent because it said that it would be subject to a 
risk of asset stranding. It argued that Murraylink had market power and would have the 
ability and incentive to restrict the level of output across its own interconnector in order 
to increase its profit. That in turn could reduce the level of flow across the system 
reinforcement USNI. The ACCC, when it came to determine the value of TransGrid’s 
asset base for purpose of determining its regulated revenue, could judge that the assets 
were underutilised, and therefore write them down. Murraylink at one point offered to be 
a proponent of USNI, but TransGrid declined to allow Murraylink to construct assets on 
its system. 
 
Witnesses called by Murraylink testified that, in their view, Murraylink did not have the 
alleged degree of market power, and would not have the incentive to reduce output to the 
extent alleged. Even if it did, the impact on TransGrid and USNI would be negligible. 
And even if the impact were significant, it could more economically be dealt with by 
redesign of USNI or by a commercial arrangement between TransGrid and Murraylink, 
than by constructing the duplicate interconnector component of SNI. 
 
The Tribunal Majority held that Murraylink did have an element of market power, which 
it might use to restrict output, and consequently that “the implementation of USNI would 
lead to a real risk of stranding or, at the very least, TransGrid’s apprehension of the risk 
of stranding is real and not unreasonable”. In consequence, TransGrid was not obliged to 
be a proponent of USNI. Nor was it obliged to allow Murraylink to construct USNI. 
Consequently USNI had no proponent and was not commercially feasible. So SNI 
maximised the net value of benefits and therefore passed the regulatory test. 
 
The Tribunal Minority held that neither NEMMCO nor the Tribunal had carried out a full 
and proper cost benefit analysis as required by the regulatory test. The whole process was 
“fundamentally flawed”. Consequently SNI was not justified. 
                                                 
36
 Majority Decision, p.26; see also p. 48 and Order for Costs para 21.  
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The Majority responded that the concern that the whole process was “fundamentally 
flawed” was not an issue that had been raised in the proceedings by any party, or by any 
of the expert witnesses. Rather, identified aspects of the modelling were subject to 
criticism. The Majority argued that the paramount task was to apply the cost benefit 
analysis conformably with the particular criteria specified in the regulatory test rather 
than by reference to cost benefit principles at large. 
 
Judicial Review at the Victoria Supreme Court 
 
Murraylink’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision cited eight 
grounds for appeal in terms of due process. The Victoria Supreme Court rejected most of 
these grounds but upheld two. It set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter 
to the Tribunal for reconsideration.37 The Court’s reasoning on the most interesting 
rejected ground and on the two accepted grounds were as follows38: 
 
1. The use of cost-benefit analysis 
 
The appellant claimed that “the Tribunal erred in law in holding or proceeding on the 
basis that it was not necessary to apply general principles of cost-benefit analysis in the 
application of the Regulatory Test”. The Court held that the question was whether the 
cost benefit analysis had been carried out in accordance with generally accepted 
standards of cost benefit analysis as conditioned by the regulatory test.  There was expert 
evidence before the Tribunal adequate to support a number of competing views as to 
whether or not it had been.  On the basis of that evidence the Minority member Professor 
McDonnell took one view and the Majority took another. The Majority were entitled to 
do so.  
 
2. SNI as an alternative project 
 
The appellant claimed that the Tribunal should have considered USNI as a practicable 
alternative to the SNI proposal. The Court agreed that “the Tribunal was bound in law to 
make an objective assessment of whether unbundled SNI (USNI) was a practicable 
alternative and that it erred in law by deciding the question on the subjective basis that 
TransGrid refused to be a proponent of USNI.”   
 
                                                 
37
 The Tribunal’s intentions in this matter are as yet unknown. It would seem open to the Tribunal to 
consider a number of options, including explaining or rejecting its previous decision on the basis of 
previous evidence, or inviting new evidence on the issues in question. It is not clear whether it would need 
to proceed if one or both of the parties indicated a change in stance in the light of events subsequent to the 
Supreme Court hearing. But all this may well have been superceded by the MCE proposal to abolish the 
Tribunal. 
38
 With respect to the five remaining grounds, the Court held that “practicable alternatives” are not different 
from “alternative projects”, that it was a false dichotomy to regard interconnectors and augmentations as 
mutually exclusive, that a set of miscellaneous objections put forward were without substance or of limited 
practical appeal, and that the Tribunal did not treat certain specified projects wrongly. The remaining 
ground was held not to add anything to the two that were upheld. 
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3. Basis of significant risk of stranding 
 
The appellant claimed, as the Court rephrased it, that the Tribunal had failed to make 
clear the basis of its finding that there was a significant risk of stranding if TransGrid 
constructed unbundled SNI. The Court agreed with this claim. 
 
The use of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory test 
 
The Court has now indicated that either the rigorous cost benefit approach advocated by 
the Minority decision or the less detailed more applied version adopted by the Majority 
decision could have been acceptable. It did not take a view as between the two, limiting 
itself to saying that the Majority approach was acceptable.  
 
This is understandable. The implications of requiring a “full” or “rigorous” cost benefit 
analysis could have been uncertain, time-consuming and costly. It ought to be possible to 
remedy the more specific deficiencies identified by some witnesses and the Minority 
member within the framework of the approach adopted by the Majority. But does the 
Court decision give reason to believe that this will happen? 
 
Consider for example one of the more serious errors or economic oversights in the 
NEMMCO and Tribunal decision processes. Witnesses argued that these processes failed 
to examine the incremental benefits of the different components of the SNI project (as set 
out in Table 1 above), and in doing so were led into error. The Minority report made a 
similar point in its general reference to comparisons between investments of different 
scale. Another commentator has made essentially the same point with respect to the 
possible combination of SNI with another line SNOVIC.39  
 
How to prevent such economic oversights in future? Is it necessary and sufficient to set 
out a series of prescriptions as to how the regulatory test should be carried out? If so, 
does this fall to the ACCC to remedy, or can certain economic oversights be sufficiently 
serious to constitute an error of law?   
 
There is no doubt scope for improved guidance in some respects,40 although the 
independence, economic competence and attitude of the regulatory bodies are at least as 
important. The Court’s decisions on the other two grounds - assessing a practicable 
project and the risk of stranding – while of interest and importance in their own right, 
also seem of relevance to the adequacy of the cost-benefit analysis. It will therefore be 
helpful to explain these decisions in more detail. 
 
                                                 
39
 According to data from the Minority report, SNI + SNOVIC combined had a benefit in the range $160m 
to $311m against a cost of $146m. Without further enquiry the combined project may have seemed 
worthwhile. However, SNOVIC alone had a benefit in the range $160m to $233m against a cost of $44m. 
The case for it was strong.  In contrast, SNI alone had a benefit in the range $34m to $135m against a cost 
of $110m. It would be difficult to make a case for it alone. Moreover, the incremental benefit of SNI 
beyond SNOVIC is in the range zero to $78m, against an extra cost of $102m. There would seem no case 
for SNI at all. But the Tribunal did not look at it in this way. Peter Garlick, P M Garlick & Associates Ltd, 
ACCC Review of the Regulatory Test, 28 March 2003, p.3. 
40
 E.g. Garlick 2003, p. 5, Littlechild 2003 pp. 18-20. Some changes have already been made (see Mountain 
and Sweir 2003) and the ACCC is presently reviewing the regulatory test again, as noted below. 
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The Court on assessing a practicable project 
 
The Court held that “the Tribunal was bound in law to make an objective assessment of 
whether unbundled SNI (USNI) was a practicable alternative and that it erred in law by 
deciding the question on the subjective basis that TransGrid refused to be a proponent of 
USNI.”?  What did the Court mean? The main steps in its decision were as follows. 
 
The Court agreed with a point made in evidence, that a favourable decision on the 
regulatory test would itself influence the practicability of an alternative project. This had 
to be taken into account in assessing practicability, which was not a separate process 
from the regulatory test, but rather one that was “substantially informed” by that test.41  
 
The Court continued 
 
“But the majority rejected that approach in favour of an assessment of commercial 
feasibility which was based upon the subjective preferences and motivation of 
TransGrid.  I consider that the majority were in error to do so.  Their error was an 
error of law.” 
 
That is, the Tribunal was wrong to determine the issue of whether an alternative was 
practicable on the basis of whether TransGrid had a real and not unreasonable reason for 
refusing to build USNI. The range of possible proponents “must include those entities 
who would be willing to construct USNI if given the chance to do so”.42  
 
The Court gave an example. Suppose a transmission operator was unwilling to construct 
an alternative project to its own proposal, but the net present value of that alternative 
exceeded the value of its own proposal. Then it cannot be right that the alternative should 
not be regarded as a practicable alternative.43 “The purpose of the regulatory test is to 
                                                 
41
 “…the act of determining that an interconnection proposal satisfies the regulatory test favourably alters 
conventional perceptions of the project’s practicability. Projects that would be utterly impractical without 
regulatory protection, perhaps because of overwhelming transaction costs, can become practical if they are 
deemed fit to be regulated. What matters is how large the net market benefit is likely to be, as the 
magnitude of the net market benefit determines the value/merit of overcoming any of the (typically fewer) 
remaining obstacles to implementation. // Practicability is an economic concept that, when applied to 
regulated investments, can be substantially achieved by a finding that a project – that can otherwise be 
legally implemented – passes the regulatory test. It is crucial to recognise the existence of inherent and 
unavoidable circularity with respect to the overall evaluation process. Practicability is not strictly an 
exogenous factor to be assessed by NEMCO or the IRPC – it is a characteristic that is substantially 
conferred by a favourable determination.” Evidence of Mr Thomas, emphasis added by the Court. 
42
 Furthermore, “… it is inevitable that there will be occasions when the proponent of an augmentation or 
interconnector is for good reason unwilling to construct an alternative (which only that entity has the 
legally enforceable right to construct), and yet the alternative should be regarded as a practicable 
alternative.” 
43
 “ … assume a proposed augmentation comprised of a 275 MW upgrade of a transmission line. Let it be 
supposed that similar results can be achieved with a technically feasible 150 MW upgrade, which costs 
considerably less, and some demand-side alterations.  Let it further be supposed that the proponent of the 
275 MW upgrade is the only entity with a legally enforceable entitlement to construct the alternative 
150 MW upgrade, and yet, for reasons based in commercial conservatism and philosophical disposition 
(which reasons are real and not unreasonable), that entity is unwilling to construct the 150 MW upgrade. 
Assume then that despite that entity’s reservations it is shown by the cost benefit analysis which is 
prescribed by the regulatory test that net present value of the market benefit of the 150 MW upgrade 
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assess alternatives on the basis of the economic criteria prescribed by the test, and not on 
the basis of subjective preferences.” 
 
The Court clarified its conception of the duty of the operator as follows.  
“The question was whether USNI was a practicable alternative and, assuming 
technical feasibility, that should have been decided objectively by reference to 
economic criteria derived from the regulatory test.  The test was whether an 
objective operator, if acting rationally according to the economic criteria 
prescribed by the regulatory test, would be prepared to construct USNI if SNI 
were not approved.  The error in the majority’s process of reasoning was to 
substitute for that test an assessment of the subjective predilections and 
motivations of TransGrid.” 
 
The Court did not rule out the possibility that a reasonable operator might refuse to 
construct SNI, because of the risks involved. However, that needed to be shown, and in 
this case had not been shown.44 
 
The Court examined the Tribunal’s treatment of the evidence of the risk implied by 
Murraylink, and found that the Tribunal had considered only part of the question. The 
Tribunal had looked at the likely effect of Murraylink’s actions on the usage of USNI. 
However, it had not looked at the likely financial effects for TransGrid if the under-usage 
eventuated.45 
 
The Court then commented on the numbers involved. Evidence before the Tribunal 
calculated a restriction of 0.00175% of USNI total flow if Murraylink was contracted and 
0.013312% of USNI total flow if Murraylink was not contracted. The Tribunal had 
pointed out that some witnesses thought it reasonable for TransGrid to regard its risk as 
                                                                                                                                                 
coupled with the demand side alterations far exceeds the net present value of the market benefit of the 
275 MW proposal. In those circumstances it cannot be right that the 150 MW alternative is not to be 
regarded as a practicable alternative.” 
44
 “That is not to deny the possibility of drawing permissible inferences from the reality and reasonableness 
of TransGrid’s reticence. Conceivably, one possibility is that any objective operator acting rationally 
according to the regulatory test criteria would, like TransGrid, be unwilling to construct USNI if SNI were 
not approved. But while the finding of reality and reasonableness of TransGrid’s reticence may suggest that 
possibility, it does not compel it; and it may not even support it if the assessment of reasonableness were 
based upon considerations at odds with the regulatory test conception of practicability.  It is one thing to 
say that TransGrid had a real and not unreasonable fear of the risk of stranding, and it is quite another to 
conclude that an objective operator acting rationally according to the regulatory test criteria would not be 
prepared to wear the risk.  An inference that such an objective operator would not be prepared to wear the 
risk could not be drawn without first considering all of the competing evidence as to the likelihood of 
objective behaviour and forming a view as to why the inference should be preferred.  The majority did not 
do that.” 
45
 “There was a body of expert evidence before the Tribunal as to the likely effect of the usage of 
MurrayLink on the usage of USNI and as to the likely financial effects for TransGrid if the risk of under-
usage were realised.  And the majority paid regard to the first part of that evidence, concerning the 
probability and extent of under-usage of USNI. … But that is as far as it went. The majority did not say 
anything about the likely financial effects on TransGrid if the feared risk of stranding [under-usage?] 
eventuated. Consequently, so far as can be told from the reasons for decision, the majority did not consider 
the question of whether an objective operator acting rationally according to the economic criteria 
prescribed by the regulatory test would be so much deterred by the risk of such financial effects as to 
decline to construct USNI if approval to construct SNI were withheld.” 
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substantial; other witnesses considered that it had not been demonstrated that the degree 
of risk would be other than trivial. In the Court’s view it required more than mere 
acceptance of the statistical analysis to resolve the competition between these alternative 
views as to what this possible restriction in usage meant for TransGrid.  
“It requires an analysis of why a risk of that order of magnitude which was 
calculated in the statistical analysis should be regarded as economically 
significant in the context of concern. My own uninformed view is that it is 
difficult to imagine that a restriction of 0.013312%, or even a figure of 100 times 
that amount, could ever be regarded as more than negligible; although, of course, 
that is not my decision to make. And it is not the point. The decision is one for the 
Tribunal to make. And the point is whether a risk of restriction of that order of 
magnitude would so much deter an objective operator, acting rationally according 
to the economic criteria prescribed by the regulatory test, as to refuse to construct 
USNI if SNI were not approved. The majority’s failure to make that decision was 
an error of law.” 
 
The Court on the risk of stranding 
 
The Court’s view of the risk of stranding was in much the same vein as its view on 
assessing a practical project. It agreed with the appellant that the Tribunal Majority had 
failed to explain why there was a significant risk of stranding: 
“a great part of the contest before the Tribunal centred on the question of whether 
the risk of stranding was anything more than negligible.  As a result, the majority 
seem to have lost sight or, perhaps more accurately, were led to lose sight of the 
real question:  was the risk (whatever its proportions) sufficient to deter an 
objective operator, acting rationally according to the economic criteria of the 
regulatory test, from constructing USNI if SNI were not approved.” 
 A “related problem was the way in which the majority approached the matter, and that is 
that they appear to have treated the risk that MurrayLink would restrict flows as if it were 
synonymous with the risk of stranding (as opposed merely to being causative of it).” 
 
The majority accepted statistical analysis that there would be a risk of MurrayLink 
reducing flows by significant percentages. However, it left out of account that the 
consequential percentage reduction in flows along USNI assets would be vastly less.46   
 
The Court noted that distinguished witnesses had said there would be a risk to TransGrid, 
and asked whether it was not sufficient to rely on this? Ordinarily perhaps, but not in the 
circumstances of this case, because it was impossible to tell how the majority reached 
their conclusions.47 Moreover, the majority had failed to mention, or give reasons for 
                                                 
46
 In the worst-case scenario, with MurrayLink completely uncontracted, it would be only 16% of 64% of 
13% or, in other words, only 0.013312% of USNI total flows. 
47
 “The problem is the way in which the majority expressed their reasons.  It is impossible to tell whether 
they reached their conclusion because they regarded the orders of magnitude calculated by Mr Campbell as 
in themselves expressing a significant risk of stranding or because, notwithstanding the orders of magnitude 
calculated by Mr Campbell, they accepted the opinions of Dr Bishop, Professor Kahn and Mr Houston that 
such orders of magnitude are properly to be regarded as a significant risk of stranding, or because, in the 
final analysis, they overlooked or did not understand the distinction drawn in Mr Campbell’s analysis 
between the risk of reductions in flows along MurrayLink and the risk and size of consequential reductions 
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rejecting, evidence that the calculated reductions in flows were too small to notice or to 
attribute.48   
“[This evidence] was at once so strikingly relevant and cogent that the Tribunal 
could not give fair and sensible reasons for its decision without adverting to it and 
assigning reasons for its rejection.  Their failure to do so is to be characterised as 
a breach of the principle that justice must be seen to be done.” 
 
Implications of the Court’s view on the reasonable operator 
 
TransGrid argued that it had a real and not unreasonable fear of the risk of stranding if it 
acted as a proponent for USNI. It also declined to allow Murraylink to be a proponent.  
The Tribunal accepted this, and said that it had no powers to compel TransGrid to do 
otherwise. 
 
I argued earlier49 that this passive stance seemed unsatisfactory, and inconsistent with 
regulatory regimes in competitive markets elsewhere. Given the cost benefit calculations 
put forward, TransGrid, NEMMCO and the Tribunal were accepting that the network 
reinforcement had a positive net benefit, and that adding the duplicate interconnector 
reduced this net benefit significantly. They were contending further that the network 
reinforcement would be too risky to adopt on its own, and that the duplicate 
interconnector element of SNI had to be bundled in as well in order to reduce the risk to 
TransGrid. But they were not looking at the whole picture. 
 
The regulatory process should have raised the question whether TransGrid (and 
NEMMCO and the Tribunal) looked adequately at the risk involved in bundling SNI as 
well as unbundling it. Witnesses for Murraylink argued that the former was much greater 
than the latter. And should TransGrid and the regulatory bodies not have looked actively 
for the most effective or least cost way in which the risk to TransGrid could be reduced to 
an acceptable level? At least two possibilities were suggested: that TransGrid could 
redesign USNI (explicitly to take account of the possibility that Murraylink as a merchant 
interconnector might find it profitable to restrict output), and that TransGrid might enter a 
contractual arrangement with Murraylink to limit the risk to TransGrid. These 
suggestions were ignored or rejected. 
 
Does TransGrid have no obligation to explore and adopt either of these actions if they 
would be more economic than building the duplicate interconnector? Examination of 
TransGrid’s duties might seem to suggest this. Section 6B(1) of its governing Act says 
that “The principal objectives of an energy transmission operator are as follows (1) to be 
a successful business …”. From a competition perspective this is perhaps not an 
                                                                                                                                                 
in flows along the USNI assets. // In my opinion the appellant is correct in its contention that failure of the 
majority to make clear its reasons for finding the stranding risk to be significant was an error of law.” 
48
 The Court heard evidence that “the reductions in USNI flows as calculated by Mr Campbell were so tiny 
that TransGrid could not discern, let alone identify the causes of such a trivial difference in utilisation.  
Logically the majority could not have reached the conclusion that the risk of stranding was a significant 
risk without rejecting that evidence.  Yet, unless the majority’s rejection of the evidence is intended to be 
encompassed in the passing reference to ‘the differing views of the economists and others’ (which is 
plainly inadequate) there is no mention of the evidence in the majority’s reasons for decision; let alone any 
reasons for its rejection. I regard that too as an error of law.” 
49
 In evidence to the Tribunal, and in Littlechild 2003. 
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auspicious beginning. Arguably the second objective is more relevant: “(2) to operate 
efficient … facilities for the transmission of electricity”. However, according to the 
testimony of the NSW minister for Energy, this Act “does not impose any duties on 
TransGrid” and “even if it were expressed in different language … it would express no 
more than aspirations or ideals which are not enforceable by a court”. Moreover, no 
regulatory body is charged with ensuring that a transmission operator abides by these 
principal objectives.50 
 
Does the Victoria Supreme Court’s decision change this state of affairs? It may seem not. 
The immediate obligation placed on the Tribunal is essentially to establish whether or not 
TransGrid was exposed to a significant risk of stranding. This may suggest that in cases 
where a significant risk of stranding can be established, the incumbent transmission 
operator need do no more: that it has the right simply to decline to be a proponent of an 
alternative scheme, and that it does not need to examine alternatives such as redesign or a 
contractual relationship.  
 
However, it may be argued that the Court’s decision implies a greater duty than this. The 
Court emphasised several times that “The test was whether an objective operator, if 
acting rationally according to the economic criteria prescribed by the regulatory test, 
would be prepared to construct USNI if SNI were not approved.” (emphasis added) The 
regulatory test says that “A new interconnector or transmission system augmentation 
satisfies this test if it maximises the net present value of the market benefit having regard 
to a number of alternative projects, timings and market development scenarios.”  
 
The Court thus seems to envisage that it should be part of the legally enforceable duty of 
the transmission operator - and for that matter of any regulatory body supervising it – to 
act in such a way as to maximise the net present value of the market benefit - at least, 
when dealing with new interconnectors and transmission system augmentations. In other 
words, if there is an alternative set of arrangements that would lead to greater market 
value than the project being evaluated – where these alternative arrangements might 
include a different (risk-minimising) design or a new contractual relationship – then it is 
the duty of the transmission operator to explore, pursue and if appropriate adopt those 
alternative arrangements. Likewise, it is the duty of the regulatory body to satisfy itself 
that such alternatives have been reasonably explored and not unreasonably been rejected.  
 
In this way, it seems that the Victoria Supreme Court has taken a step to remedy an 
apparent deficiency in the obligations of transmission operators and their regulatory 
bodies in the new competitive national electricity market. 
 
PART THREE EVALUATING THE INTERCONNECTORS 
 
A regulated interconnector perspective 
 
Assuming that the merchant interconnector Murraylink is already constructed or at least 
committed leads to a rather critical assessment of policies and decisions (by TransGrid, 
NEMMCO and the Tribunal) in relation to the proposed regulated interconnector SNI, 
                                                 
50
 These arguments are set out in Littlechild 2003. 
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which by this time would largely duplicate the service provided by Murraylink. Does a 
longer perspective – starting from the time when SNI was first proposed, before 
Murraylink was built, and looking also at the economics of Murraylink - yield a different 
perspective on the regulated interconnector SNI, on Murraylink, and on the actions of the 
incumbent transmission company?  
 
Such a ‘different perspective’ - what might be called a ‘regulated interconnector 
perspective’51- on the three main issues might be as follows: 
  
(1) on the original proposal for a regulated interconnector SNI 
- that economic or cost benefit analysis as far back as 1997 showed that an 
additional interconnector between New South Wales (NSW) and South 
Australia (SA) was economically efficient 
- that the most efficient form of interconnector was of the alternating current 
(AC) open access variety, supported by upstream reinforcement of the NSW 
transmission system 
- that the administrative criteria originally formed to evaluate this 
interconnector were specified in a way that caused certain benefits to be 
excluded 
- that the process of correcting the ‘regulatory test’ caused a delay of more than 
three years in the evaluation and approval of such a NSW/SA interconnector, 
even though an a priori net benefit had already been established; 
 
(2) on the merchant interconnector Murraylink 
- that this administrative delay – which was out of the hands of the incumbent 
transmission company or companies proposing the regulated interconnector – 
provided the opportunity for a merchant interconnector to be designed and 
built in the interim 
- that this merchant interconnector suffered from two significant economic 
inefficiencies, i.e. 
1) the need to use Direct current (DC) technology to control power flows 
across the merchant interconnector – which is critical for taking 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities – caused it to be significantly 
more costly than its AC equivalent, and  
2) the absence of the upstream reinforcement component limited usable 
capacity of the merchant interconnector, especially at peak times 
- that having two essentially parallel interconnectors is unlikely to be economic 
compared to having one interconnector of the appropriate capacity, and that 
the optimal capacity seems likely to be larger than that installed by 
Murraylink 
- that Murraylink’s support for the network reinforcement component of the 
regulated interconnector SNI could easily be construed as an attempt for it to 
secure the upstream reinforcement works needed to allow its merchant 
interconnector to operate at full capacity without needing to meet the full cost 
of those works 
                                                 
51
 I am grateful to Greg Houston for outlining this possible perspective (personal communication 9 July 
2003), without implying that he or any of the parties involved necessarily endorses it. 
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- that imperfections and inordinate delays in the administrative criteria and 
process for evaluating regulated transmission in Australia have therefore 
caused the construction of an interconnector that is clearly sub-optimal (ie 
more expensive, and perhaps under-sized) from an economic or social welfare 
perspective; 
 
(3) on the subsequent stance of the regulated transmission company (TransGrid) 
- that the economic benefits of SNI as a second interconnector, after the 
building of the merchant interconnector Murraylink, depend to a material 
extent on the operating regime of Murraylink to the extent that the latter 
possesses and exercises any market power 
- that in responding to the process for evaluating a second (regulated) 
interconnector, Murraylink as a merchant interconnector has a strong 
incentive to say one thing (i.e. downplay its market power) and do another 
(i.e. take full advantage of its market power) once it has successfully fought 
off the competing proposal, and 
- that on the other hand, the incumbent regulated transmission company 
(TransGrid) has no incentive  to withdraw its proposal for a second (regulated) 
interconnector until such time as there is an irrevocable commitment from the 
merchant interconnector not to exercise any market power it may have – 
which can only be achieved through conversion to regulated, open access 
status. 
 
The next few sections seek to evaluate the plausibility of this perspective. They approach 
the questions in reverse chronological order, by attempting to ascertain whether any or all 
of the following four interconnectors represented an economic investment: 
- The regulated interconnector SNI, given that the merchant interconnector 
Murraylink had already been built or committed? 
- The merchant interconnector Murraylink, assuming no regulated interconnector? 
- SANI, the predecessor of SNI, before or instead of the construction of 
Murraylink? 
- A different and hypothetically most efficient interconnector between South 
Australia and NSW? 
It will become apparent that “economic investment” may have a variety of meanings. The 
discussion will initially interpret this in terms of passing the regulatory test and 
alternatively in terms of financial profitability derived from providing interconnection in 
the market. Later, an alternative and arguably more customer-oriented criterion will be 
explored. 
 
The regulated interconnector SNI assuming Murraylink committed 
 
In light of the foregoing, SNI post-Murraylink can be dealt with briefly. NEMMCO and 
the Tribunal Majority held that the SNI interconnector passed the regulatory test. 
However, this was only because they ruled out Unbundled SNI. That is, they did not 
admit the option of simply reinforcing the NSW transmission system without building a 
duplicate interconnector. The Tribunal accepted that USNI was more economic than SNI 
if it were commercially feasible. In effect, it agreed that the additional value of SNI as a 
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duplicate interconnector did not exceed the additional cost. But it ruled out USNI as not 
commercially feasible. 
 
The Victoria Supreme Court has now ruled that the Tribunal did not properly justify 
ruling out the alternative of simply reinforcing the system. The Court also expressed 
some scepticism that the Tribunal could justify its decision on the evidence available. 
Thus, in the light of the ACCC criteria that NEMMCO must follow, the calculations put 
to the Tribunal by TransGrid’s consultants, the testimony of other witnesses, and the 
Court’s ruling, there seems no basis for arguing that the regulated interconnector SNI was 
economic – in the sense of passing the regulatory test - once Murraylink was constructed 
(or committed to construction). 
 
The merchant interconnector Murraylink and the regulatory test 
 
It will be convenient to take separately the questions whether Murraylink would or did 
pass the regulatory test, and whether Murraylink was a profitable investment. 
 
When Murraylink applied for regulated status, the ACCC said that it would evaluate the 
investment by carrying out the regulatory test. Murraylink suggested that the regulatory 
value of its own interconnector was the lesser of the cost of constructing it, the cost of the 
most economic alternative, and the benefit conveyed by the interconnector. It said that it 
would accept a value equal to the cost of the most economic alternative. Murraylink 
proposed four alternative transmission projects that would provide the same power 
transfer capability (220MW) and essentially the same benefits as Murraylink. It 
calculated that the benefit of an interconnector exceeded the cost of the most economic 
project. Murraylink also said that its actual capital costs of building Murraylink (which it 
did not reveal) were greater than the level of the asset value of the most economic 
alternative that it was proposing to the ACCC.  
 
The ACCC evaluated – and, where it considered appropriate, modified - Murraylink’s 
calculations of the regulatory cost of each alternative, defined as capital cost plus network 
augmentation cost plus lifetime O&M cost. It calculated the gross market benefits of 
Murraylink and its alternatives under a number of market development scenarios and 
sensitivities.  
 
The ACCC concluded that the benefits of an interconnector ranged from approximately 
$166m to $347m (present value). Within this, “The market simulation suggests that the 
credible range is between $170m and $220m.”52  
 
The ACCC set a revenue cap based on the cost of what it judged the most economic 
alternative (which was different from the alternative that Murraylink judged the most 
economic). It set allowed revenue at about $12m per year.53  
 
The ACCC said that this revenue was about 50% of the level that Murraylink had 
proposed. The clear implication is that Murraylink as actually designed and constructed 
                                                 
52
 ACCC Conversion Decision, p. xvi. 
53
 Slightly less initially, at $11.88m, rising gently over time to $12.72m in 2012/13.  
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would not have passed the regulatory test as carried out by the ACCC. There existed a 
more economic alternative whose costs were about half those of Murraylink. (Or less 
than half insofar as Murraylink’s actual costs were higher than the revenue it requested.) 
 
The profitability of Murraylink: general context 
 
The ACCC evaluation sheds new light on the question whether the merchant 
interconnector Murraylink was a profitable investment. Its proponents took a commercial 
judgement in building it, but some commentators have claimed that it could not be 
profitable. For example, Booth has calculated that “such interconnectors require sustained 
Pool price differentials of $12 - $15/MWh even at full utilisation, to have a chance of 
earning a reasonable return on investment”54. It was said that it was unrealistic to expect 
sustained price differentials of this magnitude between South Australia and 
NSW/Victoria. It was also suggested that this potential lack of profitability presumably 
lay behind Murraylink’s decision to seek regulated status. 
 
Murraylink’s costs and profitability are not publicly known. However, the ACCC 
calculations contain some relevant information. In round figures, the ACCC’s allowed 
revenue of about $12m per year would represent average revenue of just over $6/MWh if 
Murraylink’s 220 MW capacity were fully loaded throughout the year.55 The ACCC said 
that its allowed revenue was about 50% of the level that Murraylink was proposing. In 
effect, Murraylink was proposing required revenue averaging nearly $13/MWh at full 
utilisation. Murraylink indicated that its actual costs were above the level of revenue 
requested. This is all consistent with the estimated range of $12 - $15/MWh at full 
utilisation. 
 
What was the general picture at the time of investment in Murraylink? The 1997 study by 
London Economics had predicted a generation capacity shortage in SA and concluded 
that an interconnector between SA and NSW was economic. At first, the predicted 
shortage seems to have been born out by events. The 1999 NEMMCO Statement of 
Opportunities showed an installed SA capacity of 2980 MW, with a peak demand of 
2650 MW at a 10% probability of exceedance (POE).56 This suggests that there was a 
relatively small margin of capacity over peak demand in SA at that time (about 12%).  
 
Table 1 shows that average wholesale or pool prices in SA reflected this relative 
shortage: the average price there rose from $40/MWh or less in the four years up to 
1997/98 to nearly $60/MWh in 1999/2000 and 2000/01. In contrast, average prices in 
NSW and Victoria in the three years leading up to1998/1999 did not exceed $26/MWh. 
 
Table 1 Average Electricity Wholesale/Pool Prices (A$/MWh)  
 
                           Average Prices                               Price Differentials           .    
Period  SA NSW Vic Q’land  SA-NSW    SA-Vic Q-NSW 
Financial years 
                                                 
54
 Booth 2003, p. 89.  
55
 $11.88m/(365 days x 24 hrs x 220 MW capacity) = $6.16/MWh, rising to $6.60/MWh at $12.72m.   
56
 Len Gill (GM-Trading, TXU Australia), “TXU’s Perspective on Supply, Pricing and Competition in 
Australia”, Presentation at SA Power conference, 29 April 2003.  
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1994/95 40.0 52.0 45.0 50.0   -12.0  -5.0 -2.0 
1995/96 39.3 45.2 30.0 50.6    -5.9    9.3   5.4 
1996/97 38.3 22.0 24.7 55.0               16.3  13.6 33.0 
1997/98 38.3 17.5 19.2 55.0    20.8  19.1 37.5 
1998/99 43.4 25.5 25.3 60.4    17.9  18.1 34.9 
1999/00 58.7 27.7 25.7 46.5    31.0  33.0 18.8 
2000/01 57.3 38.2 45.4 41.5    19.1  11.9   3.3 
2001/02 31.6 34.5 30.9 35.1     -2.9    0.7   0.6 
2002/03 30.4 33.5 27.7 38.7     -3.1    2.7   5.2 
 
Calendar years 
1999  54.0 22.8 22.5 42.5    31.2  31.5 19.7 
2000  57.9 35.7 38.6 51.1    22.2  19.3 15.4 
2001  42.3 33.3 36.0 35.5      9.0    6.3   2.2 
2002  35.3 40.0 33.2 48.4    -4.7    2.1   8.4 
2003  26.8 26.4 23.1 22.6      0.4    3.7   1.1 
 
Source: Booth 2003 p. 211 and personal communications.57 
 
Over the four years from 1996/97 to 1999/2000 the differentials between the yearly 
average prices for SA and Victoria averaged $21/MWh – sufficient to cover the midpoint 
of Murraylink’s calculated $12 - $15 cost range if operating at about two-thirds capacity 
utilisation and ignoring transmission losses. In 2000/01 the differential was still just 
about within the range assuming full capacity utilisation and again ignoring losses. And 
even in August 2001 witnesses for TransGrid were arguing the cost and difficulty of 
building additional generation in SA, relative to NSW and Victoria.58  
 
In the event, however, many of the assumptions of the 1997 study, including about 
capacity shortage in SA, were not fulfilled.59 Approximately 1117 MW of new capacity 
(including Murraylink) has been installed in SA since 1999, but the demand has grown 
by only 400MW.60 This implies that the SA capacity margin is now very considerably 
higher (about 34%). The average price in SA fell to under $32/MWh in 2001/02, and the 
differential between SA and Victoria fell to under $1/MWh in that year. The average 
price in SA has since fallen further, to under $27/MWh in 2003. The price in Victoria has 
fallen even further, and the average differential recovered to nearly $4/MWh in 2003. 
Nevertheless, such differentials are far below what Murraylink would need to cover all its 
costs, even at full utilisation. 
 
What of the future? Table 2 shows the prices for the next few years that are presently 
obtaining in the forward markets. This is not a “thick” market as yet – maybe half a 
                                                 
57
 The price data prior to the competitive markets (Victoria 1995, NSW 1996, others by 1998) are a mixture 
of published bulk supply tariffs, calculated wholesale prices based on the revenue and sales of generation 
companies, and effective wholesale prices published by regulators. Subsequent price data are from 
NEMMCO/NECA published sources. Differentials are calculated by subtraction. The Australian financial 
year is July to June. These are time-weighted averages; demand - weighted averages are typically around 
10% higher. 
58
 As cited in Littlechild 2003, Appendix 2 
59
 Garlick, 2003, see next section 
60
 Gill, 2003. 
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dozen observations per price, hence it can be variable over time – but it does give an idea 
of how market participants are thinking.61 
 
Table 2 Electricity Forward Price Curves (A$/MWh)  
 
                           Median Prices*                               Price Differentials           .    
Period  SA NSW  Victoria  Q’land SA-NSW    SA-Vic Q-NSW 
  
Q1 2004 58.00 38.75  37.31     36.00 19.25       20.69 -2.75 
Cal yr 2004 37.00 31.925  29.75     29.00   5.075         7.25 -2.925 
Cal yr 2005 38.00 34.75  33.75     31.80   3.25         4.25 -2.95 
Cal yr 2006 38.00 36.00  34.79      33.50   2.00         3.21 -2.5 
Cal yr 2007 38.25 36.50  36.00      35.125   1.75         2.25 -1.375 
 
*Median prices for flat (100% load factor) profiles on AFMA as at 26 November 2003 
 
Table 1 shows that the average price in SA is expected to rise to nearly $60/MWh in first 
quarter 2004. T The market prices suggest the expectation of a shortage of capacity in 
South Australia. This may pull up prices in SA and Victoria too. Nonetheless the forward 
differential between SA and those regions rises to around $20 for first quarter 2004. 
However, this quarter is exceptional. Over the next few years there is apparently not 
expected to be a shortage in South Australia and any surplus in the exporting markets 
NSW and Victoria (and for that matter Queensland too) is expected to be gradually 
eliminated. For the year 2004 as a whole the SA – Victoria differential is a little over $7. 
It then gradually declines over the next three years, to a little over $2 in 2007.  
 
On this basis, trading in the markets in 2004 might yield about half the revenue that 
Murraylink as a merchant interconnector would require in order to cover all its costs – if 
it could achieve full capacity utilisation and ignoring losses. Over the next three years it 
would receive a gradually declining proportion, perhaps about one sixth by 2007 on the 
same assumptions. 
 
The profitability of Murraylink: some further calculations 
 
The above calculations have been based on differentials in annual average prices in each 
region. This ignores the scope for profitable trading to take advantage of fluctuations in 
prices – more precisely price differentials – from half hour to half hour, or even from one 
five minute interval to the next. If price differentials repeatedly reverse over time it is 
possible and indeed likely that the actual trading revenue would be greater than 
calculated from any given differential in average annual prices. In the extreme, there 
could be substantial flows (in absolute terms) and trading revenues even if there was a 
zero differential between average prices over the year as a whole.  
                                                 
61
 It has been said (in the context of a retail price control review) that “Origin’s OTC market experience 
confirms that contracting for substantial volumes usually occurs at levels significantly above the AFMA 
curve. A $3/MWh - $4/MWh premium to AFMA is an average uplift to account for this risk, however 
market premiums have been observed up to $6/MWh.” Origin Energy, letter to Essential Services 
Commission of SA re ‘2004 Electricity Standing Contract Price, Discussion Paper’, 2003, 14 November 
2003. It is not clear that any such premiums would affect the price differentials between markets. 
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Against this has to be set two other realities. First, an interconnector is unlikely to run at 
full capacity utilisation all or most of the time. In some hours the absence of price 
differentials would not justify operation at all. In other hours, even a free interconnector 
operating to eliminate price differentials would not find flow to fill its capacity to the 
limit. And a merchant interconnector concerned to maximise its revenues would not find 
it profitable to expand usage to reduce the price differential entirely. 
 
In practice, load factor is a significant consideration. In the last few years the overall load 
factor of the two regulated interconnectors QNI and Heywood has been about one half.62 
The two merchant interconnectors Directlink and Murraylink (see below) have had a 
positive flow only about half the time, and when they do flow their load factor averages 
about one third. So their overall average load factor has been of the order of one sixth.   
 
Second, use of an interconnector incurs transmission losses. In 2003 these were typically 
a little over 5% of the power transmitted.63 The price differential available to the 
interconnector is effectively about 5% less than the observed differential in the market. 
 
Data is commercially available on the actual operation of all generating plant in the 
NEM, and on the prices obtaining in each half hour, which can be used to build up a 
picture of the revenues of each plant. The same applies to interconnectors.64 Murraylink 
was in commercial operation for about a full year, from 4 October 2002 to 9 October 
2003 when it transferred to regulated status. During this period it had positive flow about 
[41%] of the time, and its absolute flow when positive averaged about 73.5 MW, or about 
one third of its 220 MW capacity. Its average achieved price differential net of losses was 
about $12/MWh.65 This is about three and a half times the [$3.50] differential in annual 
average prices over this period. However, its overall load factor was only about 14%. 
Murraylink’s achieved revenue during this year is estimated at about $3.2m. 
 
There might have been other sources of revenue open to Murraylink.  
- Its stated policy was to offer contracts for capacity. These would provide it with a 
more secure income than the uncertain price differentials, but it would not 
necessarily be a higher income than trading at spot prices. At the Tribunal hearing 
it said that it had not yet signed such contracts.  
                                                 
62
 QNI 2001 45%, 2002 40%, 2003 53%. Heywood 2002 38%, 2003 (to Oct 9th) 67%. Source: R Booth 
personal communication. 
63
 Heywood 5.7%, Murraylink 6.9%, QNI 5.6%, Directlink 3.4%. “By observation, the losses on Directlink 
are negative (compared to the flow direction) a surprising portion of the time, and increased flow reduces 
losses in the system. This is due to the fact that Directlink is well embedded in the system and affects the 
losses in the supplying and receiving systems.” R Booth, personal communication 2 January 2004. 
64
 “Merchant transmission links lodge a similar bid to a generator (10 pairs of volume and price data) with 
the price being the differential in pool prices at which they offer a band of capacity. Their bands of capacity 
get dispatched if the exporting region pool price plus their bid price exceeds the importing pool price 
(adjusted for losses). They subsequently get allocated their share of the ‘settlement surplus’ (total amount 
due to different pool prices) — effectively the amount dispatched times the difference in pool prices 
(adjusted for losses).” R Booth, personal communication 2 January 2004. I am indebted to Mr Booth for 
carrying out the calculations reported herein. 
65
 This calculation is based on average half-hourly prices. It is conceivable that higher revenues could be 
obtained from exploiting 5minute variations in prices, but this is likely to give a higher revenue only to the 
extent that there were changes in direction of flow during the half hour periods. 
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- Murraylink might offer ancillary services such as voltage support. It did indeed 
provide such support in terms of responding to requests to increase the voltage. 
However, the incumbent transmission networks have not been receptive to paying 
for such services. The ACCC subsequently put the value of the service provided 
at $6m.66 
- A feature of the SANI, SNI and Murraylink regulatory assessments was the value 
of deferring investment in the SA transmission system in the Riverland area. 
Again, however, no such benefit was paid or available to Murraylink as a 
merchant interconnector. After discussion, the ACCC subsequently put the value 
at $24m.67 
 
In assessing the profitability of Murraylink it is important not to lose sight of the broader 
business policy context for TransEnergie and Hydro-Quebec. A particular interconnector 
project may be more profitable to the proponents than the immediate revenues and costs 
imply, in terms of acquiring and publicising expertise in a new technology with a view to 
future business.68 The net revenue from one project, while important, is only part of the 
whole picture for the company.69 
 
If Murraylink turned out to be an unprofitable investment, its shareholders could be 
expected to recognise and salvage their position as soon as possible on as good terms as 
could be gained. Murraylink in fact applied for regulated status exactly two weeks after 
the interconnector began commercial operation. It cited regulatory uncertainty and ‘non-
commercial market design risks’.70 
 
                                                 
66
 ACCC Conversion Decision p. 104. London Economics had previously said that direct interconnection 
could be expected to bring about a significant stability benefit to the NEM, and that Riverlink would result 
in a more meshed network, but could not quantify that strategic benefit within the scope of the study. 
67
 ACCC Conversion Decision p. 75 although pp. 69-70 seem to suggest $18m. London Economics 1997 
initially estimated $14.4m. Murraylink proposed $25m, ElectraNet SA initially suggested $1m a year until 
2008. 
68
 DirectLink and MurrayLink were two of the earliest HVDC transmission links constructed by 
TransEnergieUS. Murraylink was an innovative technology and concept, was constructed in record-
breaking time, and won environmental awards (Littlechild 2003, fn 69). The company has subsequently 
participated in three HVDC projects in the US (Lake Erie Link, Harbor Cable between New York and New 
Jersey, and Cross Sound Cable between New England and Long Island). It advertises its expertise in 
“Innovative solutions for power transmission … We have a singular focus on the technical, commercial and 
regulatory aspects of interconnections across state and national borders.” 
(www.transenergieus.com/projects.htm, accessed 18 November 2003). In addition, buying for several such 
interconnectors could conceivably reduce the list-price costs of equipment. 
69
 Against this, however, TransEnergie’s website stresses that such business is only taken on a profitable 
basis. And TransEnergie’s partner in Murraylink is a commercial organisation presumably looking to this 
particular venture being profitable in its own right. 
70
 “Over the past three years, during Murraylink’s development, the NEM has experienced a high level of 
uncertainty particularly in relation to the interaction between the competitive and the regulated segments. 
As a consequence of that uncertainty, MTC now believes that Murraylink is now most appropriately 
operated to provide a prescribed service in the same manner as most other transmission assets in Australia.” 
Application for Conversion to a Prescribed Service and a Maximum Allowable Revenue for 2003-12, 
Murraylink, 18 October 2002, p. ii. Murraylink also pointed out that “According to the Safe Harbour 
Provisions, one purpose of the conversion process is to assist non-regulated interconnectors to avoid ‘non-
commercial market design risks’. In fact, the Murraylink Transmission Partners would not have decided to 
invest in Murraylink had it not been for the explicit opportunity stated in the Code for Murraylink to be 
converted to a prescribed service.” Murraylink Letter to ACCC (re Application), 8 April 2003, pp. 2,3. 
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The revenue offered by the ACCC for a regulated interconnector was about $12m per 
year. This was about four times what Murraylink had earned in its first full year’s 
operation. Present forward market expectations suggest that average differentials might 
be a little higher for the next couple of years, but a little lower thereafter, than applied 
during Murraylink’s year of commercial operation. In these circumstances Murraylink’s 
decision to apply for and accept regulated status, even at a revenue less than half what its 
costs were, seems understandable. 
 
The regulated interconnector SANI/SNI instead of Murraylink 
 
If it was uneconomic to build SNI as a duplicate AC interconnector after the merchant 
interconnector Murraylink was committed, would it have been economic to build the 
regulated AC interconnector SANI or SNI before and instead of the merchant 
interconnector? 
 
The two State electricity companies, acting for the two State governments that were 
proposing to build the interconnector, commissioned an independent study from London 
Economics in 1997. This found that additional capacity was required to meet demand 
growth in SA, and that an interconnector would be less costly than new generation.71 
Other studies around this time supported this conclusion.72 TransGrid relied on these 
studies in its application for regulated status.73 
 
However, NEMMCO’s formal review in June 1998 found that the SANI project was not 
justified under the original consumer benefits test.  
 
It has been suggested that this original test contained a ‘technical flaw’ or even a 
‘drafting error’, and that the revised or corrected test would have found SANI to be 
worthwhile.74  
                                                 
71
 For present purposes the main comparison was between commissioning Riverlink (250 MW) in 
1999/2000 plus 250 MW of additional generation by 2004/05, and commissioning 200 MW of generation 
capacity in 1999/2000 plus 300 MW of additional generating capacity by 2004/05. The former would cost 
$92.5m + $114.9m less $14.4m savings from reduced transmission works, total $193.0m (present value). 
The latter would cost $121.5m + $142.7m, total $264.2m. The difference of $71.1m would be further 
augmented by estimated net benefits from fuel cost savings, of which $37.2m were assumed to be passed 
through to customers.  Additional unquantified benefits were noted, associated with system reliability, 
system security, market power and dynamic investment efficiency. 
72
 E.g. “Report on technical issues, costs and benefits associated with the Riverlink interconnection – 
between the electricity networks of South Australia and New South Wales”, Interconnection Options 
Working Group (IOWG), 22 December 1997. 
73
 “TransGrid have not provided an economic analysis of the project with their application. TransGrid have 
referred to the Interconnection Options Working Group (IOWG) report previously published during the 
SANI (Riverlink) review ‘Technical Issues, Costs and Benefits of Interconnector Options for Capacity 
Support to South Australia’. TransGrid have also advised that the route for the proposed interconnection 
has not yet been finalised.” NSW – SA Interconnection: Application for Regulated Status, PL/IRPC/001, 
NEMMCO, 1 December 1998 
74
 E.g. “Paul Price, a spokesman for the National Electricity Market Management Co (NEMMCO), said the 
South Australian problem stems from the refusal by NEMMCO, which is owned by all of the States, to 
‘approve the TransGrid interconnect project proposal in 1997 between NSW and SA, because the rules at 
the time meant it had to be declared unviable.’ / Price admits that the rules were flawed and the project 
should have gone ahead. The test of viability has subsequently been amended and there are now plans afoot 
for the SA - NSW interconnection.” Australian Energy News Issue 20, June 2001. “[SANI] initially failed 
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Ernst & Young did indeed report a belief that the precise wording had not been intended. 
However, this referred to a restriction of the term ‘customer’ to ‘wholesale customer’. 
Ernst and Young explained that NEMMCO had not in fact adopted this strict and 
possibly unintended interpretation.75 
 
Ernst & Young related their recommendation for changing the test to what they called 
“the measurement problem”. This was “estimating how much of the overall economic 
benefits associated with an augmentation will be passed through to Customers in the form 
of lower wholesale prices or greater reliability”, and when this pass-through would take 
place. (They did not seem to see a similar problem in estimating the overall economic 
benefits in the first place.) They identified two arguments for restricting the Test to 
assessing customer benefits only as opposed to including producer benefits as well.76 
Having dealt with these two arguments, Ernst & Young recommended a change to the 
public or market benefit test (the sum of producer and consumer surplus).  
 
There was no suggestion in the statements by Ernst & Young or the ACCC that the 
original formulation was in error in a material respect. It was a considered decision, 
rather than an error.77 Moreover, London Economics had supported the original criterion 
and cautioned against a reformulation.78  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the regulatory test due to a technical flaw in the legal drafting of that test” and “Specifically, the test 
excluded the inclusion of infra-marginal benefits to generators due to a drafting error.” TransGrid FERC 
comments 2002, p. 18 and fn 14, resp. The latter paper references the ACCC Issues Paper. 
75
 “In our discussions with stakeholders, we have found nobody who believes that limiting the analysis to 
wholesale [emphasis added] customer benefit would be appropriate. It is also widely believed that limiting 
that this was not the intention of the Code drafters. It has been suggested that Customer initially referred to 
both wholesale and retail customers and when this definition was changed the implication for the 
augmentation provisions was not realised. // In the SANI review, NEMMCO chose to use a wider 
interpretation of “Customer”: i.e. to include both wholesale customers (i.e. retailers) and retail customers 
(i.e.consumers).” Ernst & Young, March 1999, p. 23. 
76
 The first argument (which was more a claim that the precise wording of the test did not matter) was that 
net overall benefits would be passed on to customers anyway, assuming there was sufficient competition, in 
which case public benefit and customer benefit are largely interchangeable terms. Ernst & Young believed 
that the assumption of adequate competition might sometimes be contentious, and therefore a less 
ambiguous expression of the test was required. The second argument identified by Ernst & Young was that 
since customers paid use of system charges they should not have to pay for augmentations that did not 
benefit them. Ernst & Young believed that any equity or efficiency considerations concerning who pays 
transmission use of system charges were better dealt with under the ACCC’s then-ongoing review of 
transmission charges. Ernst & Young, “Review of the Assessment Criterion for New Interconnectors and 
Network Augmentation: Final Report to ACCC”, March 1999, p. 26. 
77
 E.g. “The Customer benefits test was designed to ensure that network investment would only be 
undertaken if customers benefited from that investment.” ACCC Issues Paper, p. 2.  
78
 “It has been suggested that the criteria for determining the merits of alternative investments that are 
currently specified in the Code should be extended to incorporate the ‘benefits’ enjoyed by other market 
participants, in particular generators. … Given the market power concerns that have been identified in 
various regions of the NEM, including generator benefits as an objective for evaluating transmission or 
generation investment raises serious concerns.” London Economics 1997, pp. 6, 8.  
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Ernst and Young and the ACCC were cautious in suggesting that the previous test was 
problematic in practice.79 They made no attempt to assess whether the change in criterion 
would be likely to facilitate a project passing the test in future. Indeed, Ernst & Young 
pointed out that in some circumstances a test limited to customer benefits would be easier 
for a transmission augmentation to pass.80 Neither Ernst and Young nor the ACCC 
suggested that failure to include producer surplus had played any role in the failure of 
SANI to pass the test, or that SANI would have passed the revised test. 
 
Do more recent events validate the initial proposal? It seems not. London Economics had 
rejected an additional gas-fired base load station as a viable option, and relied instead on 
gas peaking plant to provide additional generation as an alternative to interconnection.81 
They pointed out that their calculations of the benefits from reduced generation plant 
build were particularly vulnerable to this assumption.82 In the event, additional base load 
generation was constructed in SA. In fact, a recent evaluation of the 1997 study, six years 
afterwards, has found that most of the underlying assumptions are no longer valid.83  
 
A final piece of evidence about the economic viability of SANI/SNI before Murraylink 
was built derives from the ACCC’s assessment of Murraylink’s request for regulated 
status. The ACCC explained that one of the alternative projects considered (Alternative 
1) was essentially SNI.84 After examining the evidence and arguments, the ACCC found 
that the regulatory cost of the SNI-equivalent project was the highest regulatory cost of 
all four transmission projects considered as alternatives to Murraylink.85 The cost of the 
SNI-equivalent project ($245m) also exceeded the top end of the ACCC’s credible range 
of benefits ($170m to $220m) of an interconnector. 
 
To summarise, Riverlink/SANI/SNI as originally proposed was supported by an 
independent study. But it did not pass the consumer benefit test before Murraylink 
appeared, there is no reason to believe that it would have passed the reformulated market 
                                                 
79
 E.g. “Additionally, in its review of SANI, NEMMCO found the Customer benefits test to be highly 
volatile, which might [emphasis added] make it difficult for any proposal for inter-regional augmentation to 
satisfy the criterion.” Ernst & Young, March 1999, para 1.1.2. 
80
 “… if only consumer surplus were counted in the analysis, a transmission augmentation would pass the 
test more easily because the loss of generator monopoly profit would be ignored.” Ernst & Young, 1999, p. 
3.  
81
 London Economics 1997, pp. 41-2. 
82
 “There is an important proviso to Table 7, since it assumes that no additional new generating plant will 
be commissioned in south Australia beyond the capacity support plant that has been valued here. Any 
additional plant build that is not reflected in this analysis would significantly undermine the relative 
benefits of either of the interconnect options.” London Economics 1997, p. 60. 
83
 Briefly, a new gas-fired power station was commissioned leading to a fall in SA power prices and 
reduction of trading benefits, a second source of natural gas is being introduced into SA, an existing power 
station was refurbished instead of retired, new peaking capacity was installed in SA at lower costs than 
assumed, high SA pool prices in the summer peak brought forward some demand management, and 
contrary to expectations NSW switched from winter to summer peaking and therefore no longer had 
surplus capacity to supply the SA peak. Garlick 2003. 
84
 Or at least the interconnector part of it extending from Buronga in NSW to Monash in SA, and excluding 
the section from Monash to Robertstown that lies entirely within SA. 
85
 Adding in the cost of the Monash-Robertstown link, the implied cost of SNI much exceeded the level of 
cost assumed in the NEMMCO and Tribunal proceedings. Littlechild 2003, Appendix 2. The main reasons 
for the higher cost were the allowance for undergrounding about 30km of line for environmental reasons 
and the inclusion of other costs previously omitted e.g. for interest during construction and contingencies. 
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benefit test, the assumptions underlying the case for it did not turn out to be valid in 
practice, and the SNI-equivalent project would not have passed the regulatory test as 
carried out by the ACCC.  
 
A hypothetical more economic interconnector between South Australia and NSW? 
 
Would it have been possible to design a regulated interconnector that would have been 
more economic than SNI or Murraylink? The ACCC found that the lowest cost 
alternative project (Alternative 3) was essentially along the Murraylink route86 with 
220kV AC mostly overhead line instead of 140kV DC underground line. This project had 
a regulatory cost of $142m, which was below the ACCC’s credible range of gross 
benefits.  
 
An issue of interest is the cost of AC versus DC interconnector systems. DC is generally 
cheaper than AC for overground links, and also less costly to underground, except that a 
DC converter system and control equipment are normally required, where this is not 
normally the case for AC systems. This usually puts DC cost above AC cost. The Code 
requires merchant links to be dispatchable. This can be done for AC links by means of 
(eg) phase linking transformers, but it increases their cost. Murraylink argued that the 
cost of alternatives should include the $19m cost of phase shifting transformers.The 
ACCC initially did not accept that these were required to facilitate power system 
transfers, but after further work accepted that they would be required. 
 
Murraylink argued that the costs of Alternative 3 would have been higher than the ACCC 
assumed because of the need to underground more line. The ACCC acknowledged the 
difficulty of forming a judgement here but took a more optimistic line - or a less 
environmentally sensitive one – and was not convinced.87  Accordingly, the ACCC used 
this hypothetical project as the basis for setting Murraylink’s allowed revenue as a 
regulated interconnector. The ACCC effectively deemed that this hypothetical project 
passed the regulatory test.  
 
Would this hypothetical project have been sustainable in the market if a merchant 
interconnector had chosen, and been allowed, to build and operate it? It appears not. As 
noted above, the ACCC set Murraylink’s allowed annual revenue as a regulated 
interconnector at about $12m, based on the costs of the hypothetical project. Murraylink 
is estimated to have earned only about a quarter of that in the year it was in commercial 
operation. The prospects are not significantly better over the next four years as a whole. 
Yet the ACCC effectively deemed that such an interconnector would pass the regulatory 
test. 
 
                                                 
86
 That is, from Red Cliffs in Victoria to Monash in SA, rather than the SNI route from Buronga in NSW to 
Monash. In effect, the ACCC found that the most economic interconnector of the type proposed by the 
NSW transmission operator did not terminate in (or pass through) NSW. 
87
 “Clearly, there are wildly divergent views on the degree that social and environmental issues should 
affect the development of transmission lines. MTC [Murraylink] perceived that potential (not actual) 
opposition to overhead transmission lines from environment agencies and local communities provided 
sufficient imperative to develop Murraylink as an underground line. The Commission considers that whilst 
it may have been difficult to obtain approval for an overhead line, sufficient evidence has not been 
presented to show that such approval could not be obtained.” ACCC Conversion Decision, p. 108. 
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Re-evaluation of the regulated interconnector perspective 
 
It is now possible to evaluate what was earlier called a ‘regulated interconnector 
perspective’ on the history of the last few years. 
 
As regards the originally proposed regulated interconnector Riverlink/SANI/SNI before 
the creation of Murraylink, a study at the time found this interconnector to be the least 
cost option for meeting increased demand in SA. However, the SANI proposal did not 
pass NEMMCO’s customer benefits test, and later experience has falsified many of the 
key assumptions underlying the original study. A recent ACCC assessment has 
effectively found that the proposed interconnector would have cost more than was 
previously estimated, would not have been the most cost-effective routing, and would not 
have passed the regulatory test. By the criteria of the regulatory test, any delay to the 
regulated interconnector was beneficial rather than harmful in terms of conventional 
resource allocation. 
 
As regards the merchant interconnector Murraylink, its additional costs seem primarily 
due to the additional cost of undergrounding (to avoid any environmental damage and 
associated delay) rather than the additional cost of control. Although the ACCC held that 
not all the undergrounding was necessary, it acknowledged that this was an issue on 
which “wildly divergent views” were held. If additional upstream reinforcement of the 
transmission network (unbundled SNI) would be economic in order to make best use of 
Murraylink, it would seem incumbent on the transmission network service provider 
TransGrid to take forward such investments on normal terms; there seems no basis for 
suggesting that Murraylink was attempting to avoid an appropriate share of the cost of 
this, and the Victoria Supreme Court could see none of the alleged risk to TransGrid in 
carrying out this reinforcement. Finally, the size of both Riverlink/SANI/SNI and 
Murraylink was constrained by the state of the associated transmission systems88, and 
there is no evidence to suggest that a larger interconnector would have been more 
economic. The apparent unprofitability of Murraylink may even suggest that a smaller 
interconnector or none at all could have been more economic. To the extent that this is 
true, any uneconomic costs of Murraylink were born by its shareholders, and not by 
customers of the regulated transmission company. 
 
On the subsequent stance of the transmission company, the evidence of TransGrid’s 
consultants to the Tribunal showed that the incremental net benefit of a duplicate 
interconnector was significantly negative. Moreover, a duplicate interconnector was not 
justified (and surely cannot be) in terms of protecting customers against any market 
power that Murraylink possessed and would exercise – the extent of which market power 
was strongly contested. The stance of Murraylink seems understandable in terms of 
protecting its own competitive investment against an uneconomic duplicate 
interconnector cross-subsidised by transmission users generally. The stance of the 
incumbent transmission company in maintaining its uneconomic proposal seems 
inconsistent with the findings of the Court and the ACCC (in its evaluation of alternative 
projects further to Murraylink’s application for conversion of status) and might even be 
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 E.g. “On the advice of TransGrid and ETSA Transmission, London Economics’ market modelling has 
assumed an upper limit on flows of 250 MW.” London Economics 1997, p. 46. 
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construed as predatory. The stance may reflect what the Court called that company’s 
“subjective preferences and motivation”, but it is difficult to see how it is consistent with 
the proper duties of an incumbent transmission company “acting rationally according to 
the economic criteria prescribed by the regulatory test”. 
 
PART FOUR THE CALCULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS  
 
The Queensland-NSW interconnectors 
 
The calculations above suggest that SANI, SNI, Murraylink and the alternative 
interconnector projects between NSW and SA examined by the ACCC would all yield 
trading revenues less than sufficient to cover their costs of construction. Even for the 
most economic project (Alternative 3) the prospective revenues would not exceed about 
half its costs of construction. 
 
This is a rather significant finding. Is the same true of the two interconnectors actually 
built between Queensland and NSW?  
 
It has been estimated that the merchant interconnector Directlink “reportedly cost $130m 
for its 180 MW capacity, or $722/kW” and that  
“a sustained average pool price differential of about $11/MWh would be needed 
to allow the owners to achieve a full commercial return. And this is with full 
utilisation – more practical utilisation levels would require a higher average pool 
price differential. // But since QNI has been commissioned, the Queensland - 
NSW pool price differential has been only around $2/MWh in 2001 and $8/MWh 
in 2002 - much less than that required to make Directlink pay its way, given its 
actual low utilisation”.89  
 
According to Table 1, the differential between annual average prices in Queensland and 
NSW has not exceeded $5/MWh since mid-2000, and in 2003 the differential was little 
over $1/MWh.  
 
More precise calculations show how Directlink revenues have declined. Table 3 estimates 
that Directlink earned $5.8m in the second half of 2000.90 If all units had been available 
for the full year, this could conceivably have yielded revenue to cover the estimated 
commercial requirement of just over $15m.91  
 
Since then, however, its average load factor with positive flow has not exceeded 50% on 
an annual basis, and it flows only about half the time. On actual flows over the last three 
years it achieved an average price differential about three times the differential in annual 
prices. However, its overall load factor has ranged between 8% and 27% on an annual 
basis. The estimated annual revenue from trading has not exceeded $8m, and has 
averaged under $6m. This is less than half the estimated requirement. My understanding 
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 Booth 2003, p.220 
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 Its first unit went into commercial operation in July 2000 and its final unit by the end of that year. 
91
 Booth said that Directlink could carry 1400 GWh if fully utilised, which at his estimated required 
differential of $11/MWh  equals $15.4m per year. 
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is that Directlink did not enter into contracts that might have increased such income, at 
least during the first few years. 
 
Table 3 Operating Experience of Directlink (180 MW) 
 
Year Overall Proportion When operating at positive levels Total 
 Load   Non-zero Load  Ave. Price    Revenue 
 Factor  Flow  Factor Load Differential 
 %  %  % MW $/MWh  $m 
 
2000      56.0 29.6   5.8*   
2001 15  56  26.8 48.3 25.2   5.8 
2002   8  42  19.4 35.0 51.1   7.9 
2003 27  54  50.0 90.0   8.8   3.6 
 
* Revenue in 2000 covers about six months operation. 
Source: R Booth calculation based on commercially available data, personal 
communication 
 
How far this unprofitable outcome has been due to the construction of QNI (now 1000 
MW), and how far to the commissioning of more generation in Queensland (now over 
2500 MW), is an interesting question. The figures do not prove whether Directlink would 
have profitable or unprofitable in the absence QNI. However, the decision to build 
Directlink was taken in the knowledge that QNI was under construction, and some 
increase in generation investment in Queensland was presumably to be expected in view 
of the high prices there. 
 
What about the regulated interconnector QNI? It is estimated that QNI will have cost 
$350/kW for its 1000MW capacity when fully commissioned.92 Taking these figures at 
face value, and assuming that QNI’s capital costs were half those of Directlink, this 
implies that if QNI were financed by usage charges it would require a sustained pool 
price differential of about $5.50/MWh (half the $11/MWh required for Directlink) at full 
utilisation in order to achieve a commercial return. Since QNI has recently operated at 
about half utilisation, that implies a required differential of about $11/MWh. 
 
In fact, the actual differentials between Queensland and NSW annual prices from 
2000/01 onwards have averaged less than a third of that, about $3/MWh. The differential 
in forward prices is presently projected to fall to less than half that level over the next 
three years.93 
 
Thus, it presently seems that revenue from trading in the market would have covered less 
than about half the costs of the merchant interconnector DirectLink and only a small 
fraction of the costs of the regulated interconnector QNI. The picture over the next few 
years is for even lower revenues. 
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 Booth 2003 p. 220. 
93
 Interestingly, the forward prices in Queensland are now lower than in NSW, and the net interconnector 
flows are presently from Queensland into NSW. 
 34
The criteria for evaluating interconnectors 
 
Price differentials will of course fall after an interconnector is built, but a merchant 
interconnector would not aim to reduce them below the level needed to finance 
construction. Should a regulated interconnector do so? If the prospective market benefits 
of regulated interconnectors, as reflected in their actual or potential trading revenues, are 
significantly less than the costs of constructing them, why are they nonetheless advocated 
and built? If consumer groups would ultimately have to pay for uneconomic investments, 
one would expect them to object. Yet, on the contrary, they and government ministers 
seem to support regulated interconnectors. Indeed, it has been claimed that “The QNI 
interconnection was a great success.”94 Why is this? 
 
One argument for a regulated interconnector is that it would operate at a lower 
(regulated) margin rather than at the higher monopolistic margin associated with a 
merchant interconnector.95 To the extent that this relates prices more closely to costs, it 
might be argued to increase consumers’ welfare (in a static context). But it assumes that 
an interconnector of some kind is beneficial in the first place, and does not address the 
issue of size. 
 
The main argument seems to be that the criterion for judging an interconnector should be 
the benefit to consumers, not to consumers plus generators, and not measured in terms of 
trading revenue or profit. Eliminating regional price differentials, including price spikes, 
is desirable in itself.96 Even if an interconnector (merchant or otherwise) did operate on a 
margin that only just covered its costs, with no monopoly profit, this would be 
unsatisfactory because it would not eliminate the price differentials between markets. For 
example, some regard a usage-based charge as itself undesirable.97 Booth comments that 
“such [merchant] interconnectors require sustained pool price differentials of $12 - 
$15/MWh even at full utilisation to have a chance of earning a reasonable return on 
investment - quite the opposite effect to that required for an efficient NEM”.98 A related 
concern is that a merchant interconnector would have inadequate capacity, or would be 
used to an inadequate extent, because it would need to recover its capital costs from the 
difference in prices between the markets at either end of the interconnector; as a result it 
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 Booth 2003, p. 88 
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 “The Transenergy-Murraylink interconnect works by buying energy effectively at a low margin in New 
South Wales/Victoria, and then selling it at a higher margin into the South Australian market. Riverlink, by 
contrast, buys at a low margin in the New South Wales and Victorian market, and then is forced by the 
regulator to effectively sell that energy at a low margin again in South Australia. And the obvious 
difference being is that the Riverlink interconnect produces a much lower price for South Australian 
customers. The Transenergy-Murraylink project produces the highest profits and prices for the investor, 
that is, Transenergy.” Danny Price, London Economics, interviewed in radio program Power Games - The 
Politics of Electricity, produced by Tom Morton, Sunday 19 March 2000. 
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 These concerns are understandable. There are references to high prices at various places in this paper, 
and I am told that price spikes (over $300/MWh) contributed some 28% of generator revenue last year. 
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 “If prices are not set to produce an efficient outcome then this form of investment [unregulated merchant] 
will result in lower social welfare. For example, a pricing structure based on a usage-based charge … may 
undermine the benefits of interconnects on the remainder of the NEM. This is because usage-based prices 
may distort energy prices and hence reduce the potential for arbitrage across networks.” London Economics 
1997, p. 15. 
98
 Booth 2003, p. 89 
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could not extend capacity or output to the extent necessary to eliminate the average price 
differential.  
 
The implied contrast is with a regulated interconnector that would not need to maintain 
such price differentials because it would recover its capacity cost by inclusion in the 
regulated asset base.99 The implication is that even cost-related price differentials are in 
themselves inefficient, which would seem to imply that merchant interconnectors are less 
economic than regulated interconnectors, almost regardless of the circumstances. 
 
The optimal size of an interconnector 
 
To analyse these points, put aside the issue of market power possibly exercised by a 
merchant interconnector, and consider the optimal size of investment in regulated 
interconnector capacity and its relation to the financing of that interconnector. Assume 
for simplicity of exposition that the interconnector capital costs are constant per unit of 
capacity; that operating costs are negligible; that demand is uniform in each period of the 
day and year; and that the criterion of benefit is net value of output (consumer plus 
producer surplus). In Figure 1, let D and S denote, respectively, the net demand curve in 
the importing market and S the net supply curve in the exporting market (ie after taking 
account of increases or reductions in supply from generators in each market).  
 
Consider first an interconnector financed by usage charges on the amount transmitted 
across it. Assume that capacity and output equals OY in each period, such that the 
differential in prices (P2 – P1) is equal to the unit cost of capacity per period. Then total 
revenue is equal to (P2-P1) times throughput OY, which equals the total cost per period of 
installing the capacity. This interconnector could be financed by a usage charge equal to 
this differential in prices. 
 
In contrast, consider an interconnector financed through the interconnector rate base. 
Assume capacity and output OY* in each period, at the point where the demand and 
supply curves intersect at B. In this case the price differential would be eliminated, 
interconnector revenue would be zero, and a uniform price P* would obtain across both 
markets. Total cost would be covered by increasing rate base revenue by the amount (P2 – 
P1) times OY* per period. 
 
The suggestion seems to be that financing via the rate base leads to the optimal capacity 
and trade OY* and that financing by usage charges leads to a welfare loss due to the 
restriction in capacity and trade from Y* to Y. The amount of this loss is said to be equal 
to the area of the triangle ABC. The upper part of this triangle reflects restricted use of 
electricity in the importing market, the lower part reflects restricted output from the 
exporting market. 
 
If the criterion is aggregate net benefit to all market participants, and if costs (or supply 
curves) are taken as given, this suggestion would be incorrect, or incomplete, for at least 
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 “In contrast, under Chapter 6 of the Code a significant proportion of charges is postage stamped and as a 
regulated interconnect under the Code, there is only an indirect link between use of asset and payment for 
it. To the extent that charges are fixed, they are less likely to influence energy flows across the 
interconnect.” London Economics 1997, p. 15. 
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three reasons. First, it is incorrect to assume there is a net welfare gain in these two 
markets from reducing the price differential to zero. On the contrary, there is a net 
welfare loss. The additional capacity costs a total of (Y* - Y) times (P2 – P1) to provide, 
equal to the rectangle AEFC, but the additional benefit it provides is only the triangle 
ABC. 
 
The net welfare loss associated with the extra capacity is the difference in area between 
the rectangle and the triangle, namely the triangle BCF plus the triangle ABE. Assuming 
straight line demand and supply curves as an approximation, the benefit of the additional 
trade made possible by abolishing usage fees amounts to only half the cost of providing 
the additional capacity.  
 
Second, the analysis assumes there is no welfare loss associated with collection of the 
cost of the interconnector through the rate base. In practice, price needs to be increased 
on some other good or service in order to provide enough revenue to cover the total cost, 
equal to the whole area P1EFP2 in Figure 1. That will reduce consumption and output by 
a certain amount, yielding a comparable welfare triangle to the purported welfare loss 
triangle ABC. This may or may not be of a significant magnitude. It might be argued that 
the demand for use of the electricity transmission grid is relatively inelastic, and that the 
distortionary costs of collecting transmission revenue from connection or use of system 
charges is relatively small. However, it should not be ignored in principle.100 
 
Third, this discussion has hitherto assumed that the designers of a regulated 
interconnector know what size to build it and indeed build it to that size. In practice, 
however, they have to estimate the demands and costs involved and come to a judgement 
on size. Financing by usage charges provides an immediate feedback on the extent and 
value of demand. It provides input on the wisdom of the decision to build the 
interconnector to that size, or indeed at all. Financing by adding to the asset base provides 
no such input. Coase and others made the same point half a century ago in the earlier 
discussions on marginal cost pricing. More recent discussions of ownership and 
efficiency make a similar point. Having to cover costs from the value of output provides a 
greater stimulus to accurate forecasting and efficient investing than does recovery of 
costs from a general asset base. 
 
To summarise, some commentators have argued that, other things being equal, recovery 
of the costs of an interconnector through the rate base in order to reduce or eliminate 
price differentials between markets is more efficient than recovering it via differentials 
calculated to recover those costs. In fact, if the criterion is the aggregate net benefit to all 
market participants, and if costs are taken as given, then the opposite is the case. 
 
The value to customers 
 
If an interconnector financed via the rate base is less efficient than an interconnector 
financed by price differentials in the market, why is there such pressure for the former 
                                                 
100
 The earlier discussions of marginal cost pricing, in the 1940s and 1950s, established this point. Even if 
the government met non-marginal costs, they would still have to be funded in some way. If they were 
recovered from income tax, for example, this would still represent a tax on labour or enterprise and hence 
would have a disincentive effect. See Coase 1946. 
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type of investment? One answer seems to be that, in plausible circumstances, such 
investment can bring benefits to customers. 
 
Consider the representation of the investment decision in Figure 1. Take the limiting case 
where the supply curve S is flat. This might reflect a situation where new generation can 
be supplied by the exporting at low and constant long run cost, whereas in the importing 
area there is a higher and upward sloping long run supply curve. (Such conditions were 
commonly thought to apply in the exporting and importing areas of Australia where 
interconnectors were proposed.) In this case there is no distinction between P* and P1, 
both of which are equal to the constant long run cost of generation in the exporting area. 
The cost of an interconnector is still P2 – P1 per period. Such a situation is shown in 
Figure 2. For the moment, assume that competitive conditions apply in both areas. 
 
In these circumstances, the additional value to all market participants of extending the 
interconnector capacity from Y to Y* is still only about half the extra cost of doing so. 
(The triangle A’BC is approximately half the area of the rectangle A’BFC.) However, the 
impact of this extension is beneficial to customers in the importing area in three respects.  
- First, it provides consumer surplus on that part of the additional output YY* that 
extends consumption, and producer surplus on that part that replaces more costly 
domestic generation, where the total of these two benefits is given by the triangle 
A’BC. 
- Second, it reduces the revenue paid by these customers on the output of the 
previous interconnector capacity OY, by an amount (P2 – P1) x OY. 
- Third, it reduces the price paid by these customers on the whole quantity of 
electricity purchased in the importing area before the construction of the 
interconnector, by an amount (P2 – P1) times this quantity. 
 
The first of these items is a net welfare gain, the second item is a transfer of the 
interconnector cost from consumers in the importing area to system users generally (and 
hence a transfer of income in the opposite direction), and the third item is a transfer of 
income from producers to consumers in the importing area. The sum of these three 
benefits to customers in the importing area exceeds whatever share of the additional cost 
A’BFC they might have to pay.  
 
From the point of view of importing customers, extending the capacity of the 
interconnector beyond what usage charges in the market would sustain, and instead 
paying for it by an addition to the regulated asset base, may thus be a rational economic 
decision. Under the assumed conditions, market participants in the exporting area are no 
better or worse off, except to the extent of their share of the additional costs of the larger 
interconnector. The main burden falls on generators in the importing region, in the form 
of loss of producer surplus on their previous volume of output. How far these generators 
count in the political calculus may depend on the circumstances.101  
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 For example, whether the generators are state owned or privately owned, and whether privatisation and 
flotation are imminent. For another discussion of the magnitude of the transfer effects of interconnectors, 
see Greg Houston, Efficient electricity transmission: where to from here? Presented to the Australian 
conference of economists, Adelaide, South Australia, 3 October 2002. 
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 Proponents of regulated interconnectors effectively acknowledge – and welcome - this 
distributional impact. For example: 
 
The experience with this interconnection [QNI] has been extremely encouraging – 
quite dramatically reducing both average pool prices, the level of volatility, and 
the cost of ancillary services in Queensland and New South Wales. It proves a 
strong recommendation for planned and regulated interconnections.102 
 
The perceived benefit evidently lies in the reduction in prices (and price spikes) to 
customers, not offset by any reduction in prices to producers. The criterion is not the 
aggregate benefit to customers and producers.  
 
The same approach is reflected in calculations of whether the benefits of a regulated 
interconnector exceed the cost:  
To put this another way, had Directlink had been the only interconnection, and 
had it been used to maintain a pool price differential of $11/MWh, Queensland, 
with 42,000 GWh of generation, would have sustained additional wholesale pool 
costs of over $460 million per year, enough to pay for the installation of QNI in 
just 12 months of operation. // Similar sums can be conducted for the Murraylink 
project between Victoria and South Australia, where it can be calculated that, if 
Murraylink is operated to provide a full commercial return, a Victoria – South 
Australia pool price differential of almost $14/MWh is required – compared to an 
actual differential of around $5/MWh since January 2001. South Australia would 
be forced to experience an additional wholesale cost of around $78 million. 
Enough to pay for the free-flowing SNI link in about 15 months of operation.103 
 
Here, ‘paying for the installation of the interconnector’ evidently means that the benefits 
to customers (as a result of lower prices) cover the cost, not that the aggregate net 
benefits to all market participants do so. 
 
Generation market power  
 
So far the analysis has proceeded without reference to generation market power. 
However, higher prices in the importing areas may be attributed in whole or in part to 
market power in those areas. Four implications for the foregoing analysis might be noted. 
One relates to income transfers, the other three to real or net welfare effects. 
 
First, an assumption of market power in the importing area gives a boost to the moral 
case for taking account of transfers of income from generators to customers. If customers 
are being exploited, if the generators’ income is excessive or ill-gotten, why should a 
reduction in such income count against a proposed interconnector? 
 
Second, it may be argued that generation market power restricts capacity and output in 
the importing area, causing a net welfare loss relative to a competitive outcome. If an 
interconnector increases output this is a net welfare gain. The extent of this is more 
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 Booth 2003, p. 218 
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 Booth 2003, pp. 220-1. The calculation in the first cited paragraph references Bardak Ventures, An 
Assessment of the First Six Months of Operation of QNI, available from www.bardak.com.au 
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debatable. The net increase in output is not simply the capacity of the interconnector. A 
monopolist will typically respond by reducing output, as for example with limit pricing. 
If, in the limit, the monopolist absorbs all the interconnector output in terms of reducing 
its own output, there is no welfare gain to consumers. In practice, it will be profitable to 
concede something on price and something on output.  
 
Third, with competitive markets it is assumed that price reflects generation cost at the 
margin and that imports will only displace domestic generation if they are less costly. 
With market power that is no longer the case. Domestic price exceeds domestic cost at 
the margin. There could be a welfare loss insofar as the cost of the imported energy 
(export cost plus interconnector cost) is less than price but exceeds the cost of the 
domestic generation that it replaces.  
 
Fourth, with competitive markets it is conventionally assumed that generation is 
productively efficient. In contrast, the ‘competitive benefits’ argument discussed below 
assume (in part) that generators with market power are not necessarily productively 
efficient, so that interconnectors can increase productiveness by stimulating greater 
competition in generation. A similar argument is extended to the benefits of increasing 
competition in retail and financial markets, and the advantage of a single price throughout 
the market, which may facilitate trading or hedging. Typically, such benefits are noted in 
principle but not quantified.104 The ACCC’s recent review includes whether competition 
benefits should be included in the regulatory test, and if so how.105 
 
The analysis and calculation of benefits in the regulatory test 
  
The foregoing discussion has established that there are conflicting objectives and criteria 
for assessing the benefits and size of regulated interconnectors, quite apart from concerns 
about regulated versus merchant interconnectors. In view of this, how have the regulatory 
bodies resolved these conflicts? 
 
One might conjecture that they have felt torn. The political context broadly demands 
more (and bigger) interconnectors as a way of reducing price to customers in the 
potentially importing regions and improving the National Electricity Market. Yet 
conventional economic criteria do not justify such price reductions at face value.  
 
Consider the three broad categories of benefit discussed hitherto that might be used to 
justify such proposals: 
- the net benefits of trading between high and low price regions 
- the price reductions to customers in the high price regions 
- the benefits of a more competitive market. 
 
Trading benefits are the obvious starting point, and past, present and forward prices and 
price differentials in the markets provide one means of estimating these. But experience 
increasingly suggests that market differentials would not suffice to cover costs. There is 
pressure to extend capacity and trade beyond what cost-related price differentials would 
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 E.g. London Economics 1997, sections 2.3.2 and 5.3.1 
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 Review of the Regulatory Test Discussion Paper, ACCC, February 2003. 
 41
justify. Price reductions to customers reflect the criterion that many have argued for. 
However, such reductions are inconsistent with the general thrust of economic thinking 
on cost-benefit analysis, and with the 1998 reformulation of the regulatory test that 
explicitly substituted benefits to the market as a whole (consumer plus producer surplus) 
for customer benefits alone. A more competitive market brings benefits in principle, but 
measuring them is difficult.106  
 
In the most recent calculation, dealing with Murraylink’s application for regulatory 
status, the ACCC found that interconnector project Alternative 3 would be the most 
economic design and routing, at a cost of $142m. It assessed the credible range for 
interconnector benefits at $170m to $220m. Alternative 3 would therefore pass the 
regulatory test. But the calculations above suggest that even this project, if financed by 
user charges, would not be able to recover its costs in the market. By implication it would 
not have a positive net market benefit. How can it then pass the test?  
 
The ACCC took the view that “there are four broad types of benefits that Murraylink and 
its alternatives can bring to the NEM. These are energy benefits, deferred market entry 
benefits, reliability benefits, and Riverland deferral benefits.” (p. 76) The energy benefits 
would comprise savings from less expensive generation in one region displacing more 
expensive generation in another region, and reducing the expected frequency and 
magnitude of voluntary load reductions or curtailments. The deferred market entry 
benefits would be the associated deferrals of capital expenditure. The reliability benefits 
are the reductions in unserved energy as demand is less likely to exceed supply, where 
these unserved demands are valued at the Value of Lost Load specified in the Code 
($10,000 MWh). Riverland deferral benefits, as explained above, are the value of 
deferring the need for major transmission reinforcements in the Riverland area.  
 
With two small modifications107, the ACCC accepted Murraylink’s consultants’ 
calculations of these benefits over a 39.5 year horizon. These are set out in Table 2 for 
the most economic project (Alternative 3). The figures are the same or similar for other 
alternatives including Murraylink itself. 
 
Table 2 Gross market benefits of the economic project (Alternative 3) ($m) 
 
Energy      77 
Merchant entry (capital)   49 
Merchant entry (O&M)       5.4 
Reliability (VoLL = $10,000/MWh)  62 
Riverland deferral    22 
Riverland O&M        1.9 
Total       218 
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 Explicitly assigning benefits to reducing prices to customers and competitive benefits may also raise 
questions as to whether this is the most economic way of achieving those ends, and why other steps are not 
being taken to increase competition in the generation market. 
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 The modifications were to reduce the Riverland deferral benefits, and to bring forward the timing of 
possible augmentations to the Victorian network, thereby reducing these benefits also. 
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These benefits sum to $218m. As noted, the ACCC’s market simulations suggested that 
the most credible range was $170m to $220m – that is, predominantly lower than $218m. 
 
Transfers of income to consumers are evidently not included in the calculation. Nor are 
benefits to competition. 
 
London Economics had argued that an interconnector would have greater system 
reliability benefits than more generation.108 It estimated that Riverlink would have less 
unserved energy; valued at VoLL of $5000/MWh this would be worth $3m. NEMMCO’s 
evaluation of SNI substantially increased this element.109 Murraylink and the ACCC, 
using VoLL of $10,000/MWh, estimated reliability benefits at $62m, over a quarter of 
the total benefits, and twenty times what London Economics had estimated.110  
 
These calculations assume that the building of an interconnector means a net increase in 
reliability that could not or would not be matched by additional generation. Whether and 
how generation capacity could otherwise be appropriately rewarded in the ancillary 
services and other markets is unclear. But $62m is a rather large amount of money to 
attribute in this way, and it would be surprising if some form of market test could not be 
designed. 
 
The two largest benefits in the test are related to Energy and Merchant entry, totalling 
over $131m. It is not clear why these would not be reflected in market prices and hence 
in the value of market trading. Since Alternative 3 had a regulatory cost of $142m, which 
led to allowed revenue of about $12m per year, this suggests that market benefits of 
$131m would be associated with annual revenue of about $11m a year. It was calculated 
above that trading in 2003, and prospectively over the next few years, might recover 
about half that amount. In other words, over the foreseeable future, the market seems to 
expect that the trading benefits of an interconnector are of the order of one half the level 
that the ACCC has assumed in its calculation. 
 
The ACCC report does not mention forward price curves. It is not clear whether the 
ACCC takes a different view of future prices than the market, or whether the kinds of 
energy and entry benefits it measures are assumed not to be available in the market.111  
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1997, p. 60 
109
 “It is notable that in the only significant interconnector investment (SNI) evaluated by the 
IRPC/NEMMCO, by far the greatest proportion of the value is attributable to reliability benefits rather than 
regional price arbitrage benefits.” Mountain and Swier 2003, fn 1.  
110
 If a higher value of VoLL were assumed, this item would be even larger. At VoLL = $29,600/MWh, 
which was actively canvassed, the reliability benefit would be three times larger, at $182m, and would 
account for over half of the total benefit of $339m. 
111
 The ACCC says that “The regulatory test is based on the traditional cost-benefit analysis with key 
features that include … calculating the net benefits of the various options with reference to the underlying 
economic cost savings and not with reference to pool price outcomes which may be distorted by market 
participants exercising market power.” ACCC Conversion Decision p. 5. This would not seem to preclude 
using past, present and forward prices as a check on the plausibility of the assumptions made about the 
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The final element in the benefit is the Riverland deferral benefit. This is assumed to 
account for about an eighth of the total benefit. Presumably it could have been paid to 
Murraylink for providing the same benefit as a merchant interconnector, but there was no 
provision for this.112 
 
It thus seems that, in the latest application of the regulatory test, 60% of the benefits were 
related to market benefits; they were estimated equal to about twice the level that the 
forward market indicates as recoverable, but this direct comparison was not made. The 
remaining 40% of the benefits were reliability benefits and transmission deferral benefits 
that at present are not recoverable or testable in the market. In this way, regulated 
interconnection, with a prospect of eliminating or narrowing price differentials between 
the regional markets, has been reconciled with the traditional and specified criterion of 
economic benefits for the market as a whole rather than benefits for consumers only.  
 
This obviously raises the question of how the accuracy of estimates used in the regulatory 
test can themselves be tested, or whether indeed it is intended that they be tested. It also 
raises the much-debated question about ‘competitive neutrality’ between merchant and 
regulated projects. That aim of policy was emphasised at one time, but seems to have 
been abandoned or at least downplayed recently.113  
 
Latest developments in policy 
 
Ministers seem to have witnessed the continuing conflicts and delays about regulated 
interconnectors with growing impatience. At the State level, construction of a duplicate 
regulated interconnector between SA and NSW/Victoria was a recent election 
commitment in South Australia.114 The governments of NSW and SA, as well as the 
incumbent NSW transmission company, have filed an appeal against the Victoria 
Supreme Court judgement. 
 
At a national level, Ministers had previously encouraged the ACCC to review the 
customer benefits test that had not approved the first proposed regulated interconnector. 
Subsequently, the ACCC has been reviewing the regulatory test that replaced it, and 
considering the case for taking account of ‘competition benefits’. This review now seems 
                                                                                                                                                 
nature and timing of future investments, with due allowance for any assumed market power. In fact, the 
regulatory test requires that “modelled projects should be developed within market development scenarios 
using two approaches” where one of these called market-driven market development “mimics market 
processes by modelling spot price trends”. Reprinted in ACCC Conversion Decision p. 79. 
112
 Although payments have been made to generators for transmission network support and discussed for 
distribution networks. 
113
 Ernst & Young recommended that “The relevant benefits to measure are those that can also be captured 
by non-regulated alternatives.” Final Report, March 1999, paras 4.2.9 and  8.1. This recommendation did 
not find its way into the ACCC’s actual changes in the wording of the test. 
114
 E.g. “The Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, Senator Nick Minchin, has called for ‘State 
Governments to remove whatever road blocks there are and take some tough decisions on getting 
interconnectors in place’.” Australian Energy News, Issue 20, June 2001. “One of Labor’s key pledges in 
this campaign is to see an interconnector to NSW built that will give us access to cheaper power. We will 
fight to see it happen.” State Labor Leader Mike Rann (Australian Labor Party), Labor’s Bold New Plan to 
Tackle Power Price Rises, Press release in 2002 State Election, 3 February 2002. 
 44
to have been overtaken by ministerial thinking. In June 2001 Ministers commissioned a 
Review whose final Report issued in December 2002.115 This found that: 
 
The current state of transmission is one of the most significant problems facing 
the NEM. … Inadequate transmission links, and the poor transmission 
arrangements, effectively ‘regionalise’ the NEM and remove most of the benefits 
that were envisaged with a national market. The NEM is largely five trading 
markets, not one. This is seen in the price separation that occurs between markets.  
 
The Report identified five main transmission problems, including “a flawed system for 
augmenting transmission investment, which sees inadequate links being built: 
- There is confusion in having both regulated and unregulated interconnectors, and 
they have crowded each other out. 
- In the case of regulated interconnectors, the currently applied regulatory ‘benefits’ 
test is inappropriate. This is because the test is not a commercial one as it ignores 
the market power that can be exercised when transmission lines bind. 
- For unregulated interconnectors, the key problem is that they cannot address intra-
regional constraints.”116  
 
The Report proposed to introduce Firm Transmission Rights. The price of these would be 
the key indicator of the need for transmission augmentation. NEMMCO would publish 
information that would trigger a competitive tender process.  
“The trigger proposal would replace the regulatory benefits test for new 
interconnects, and transform the assessment process from a pure ‘economic’ test 
to a ‘commercial’ test that would more adequately capture the wider benefits 
resulting from alleviating inter-regional constraints, particularly in terms of 
improving inter-regional trade and strengthening competition throughout the 
NEM.” (p. 144) 
 
The Ministerial Council on Energy - established by the June 2001 CoAG meeting to 
oversee the review process – considered the Parer Report and other submissions, and 
reported on 11 December 2003. On transmission, its principles included that 
- “There is a central and ongoing role for the regulated provision of transmission, 
with some scope for competitive (market) provision. … 
- The regulated framework should maximise the economic value of transmission, 
including through the efficient removal of regional price differences in the 
operation of the NEM.”  
 
Its proposed package of reforms included two new statutory commissions: an Australian 
Energy Market Commission (AEMC) with responsibility for rule-making and market 
                                                 
115
 “The Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) at its 8 June 2001 meeting endorsed a national energy 
policy framework that acknowledged the strategic importance to the economy and national prosperity of 
reliable, competitively priced energy. At this same meeting, CoAG agreed to commission an independent 
review of the strategic directions for energy market reform in Australia – the Energy Market Review.” 
Towards a truly national and efficient energy market, Council of Australian Governments’ Independent 
Review of Energy Market Directions (Hon Warwick Parer, Chair), Canberra, 20 December 2002, p. 59. 
116
 Parer Report p. 23. The other four problems were: fragmented planning, lack of firm financial 
transmission rights, a lack of market incentives for regulated interconnectors, and state-based regions that 
do not reflect the needs of the market.  
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development, accountable to and subject to the power of direction of the MCE, and an 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) with responsibility for market regulation, and to be a 
constituent part of the ACCC. The MCE also proposed: 
- “A last resort planning power, to be exercised by the AEMC (a new Australian 
Energy Market Commission, to direct that inter-connection projects be subjected 
to the regulatory test. … 
- A new regulatory test will be implemented to recognise the full economic benefits 
of transmission, including where transmission is the most efficient means of 
mitigating market power. The new test will remove impediments to regulated 
transmission in dispute resolution, and information requirements. The MCE will 
develop Code changes for implementation in July 2004. These changes will take 
account of the ACCC’s current review of the regulatory test. …… 
- The MCE believes that the current arrangements for the coexistence of regulated 
and market provision of transmission have not resulted in optimal outcomes, and 
supports removal of biases towards unregulated investment. The MCE will 
develop Code changes that establish a level playing field between regulated and 
market transmission for implementation in July 2004.” 
 
Three points might be noted here. First, the Parer Report, and presumably the MCE too, 
see the cost of the inadequate interconnection as the cost to customers rather than to 
market participants generally.117The removal of price differences between regions and the 
achievement of more competitive markets are seen as desirable in their own right. 
Second, the Parer Report saw the solution to the interconnection problem in terms of 
more accurate price signals including via financial transmission rights. The MCE seems 
less sympathetic to market approaches. Financial transmission rights, whatever their 
merits in other respects, do not feature in the proposed solution.118 Third, however, the 
solution is still to be found in redefining the nature of the regulatory test to include “the 
full economic benefits of increased competition”.  
 
What will this mean? A key issue is whether “competition benefits” will be limited to 
increased productive and allocative efficiency, or will include benefits transferred from 
generators to consumers, in the form of lower or less volatile prices. The latter is what the 
proponents want, and arguably it would formalise what has been happening in practice, 
via the measurement of benefits deemed to relate to the market as a whole. But it is not 
what the regulatory test has hitherto allowed.119 Which outcome is desirable is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The point here is that economists can no longer assume that regulated 
investment is chosen to seek the same ends as unregulated investment.120 
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 As an instance of the inadequate interconnection between regions, the Parer Report (p. 129) reported 
calculations that there were 88 ‘price separation events’ in the NEM during 2001-2, costing a total of 
$651.5m. A price separation event is where the price in any region is more than $300/MWh higher than the 
minimum price in the NEM. The cost of this event is calculated as the amount of the excess over 
$300/MWh multiplied by the total load in that region (rather than the marginal load that might have been 
met by more imports).   
118
 “The MCE considers that the primary role of financial transmission rights (an inter-regional trading 
instrument) is to provide a risk management tool for energy trading, and that further development of such 
arrangement may be desirable.” MCE 2003, p. 11 
119
 See for example Discussion Paper Review of the Regulatory Test, ACCC, 5 February 2003. 
120
 In the simple terms of Figure 1, if merchant investment is assumed yield a welfare loss by restricting 
capacity and output to less than OY, then regulated investment has to be assumed to yield a welfare loss by 
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PART FIVE ANALYSING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
 
Alternative models of transmission investment 
 
I have suggested previously (Littlechild 2003) that the debate about merchant versus 
regulated transmission has hitherto largely been couched in terms of the “market failure” 
paradigm. This paradigm takes as given the demand curves for electricity, the state of 
technology, and the cost curves for generation and transmission. Proponents of merchant 
transmission suggest that, with locational prices reflecting marginal costs, transmission 
investment could be a competitive and efficient activity. Sceptics suggest various market 
failures: merchant investment in transmission is likely to restrict output and investment in 
order to maximise profit in a situation of market power; it may ignore certain externalities 
(e.g. loop flow); and the transactions cost of accommodating it in the operation and 
maintenance of an existing network could be significant.  
 
The implication of this paradigm is that the alternative of regulated transmission would 
avoid these market failures and achieve the social optimum without all the problems of 
merchant investment. In the absence of any countervailing argument in favour of 
merchant investment, other than a philosophical preference for markets over regulation or 
a vague feeling that the prospect of losses would sharpen decision-making, why bother 
with it? Experience with merchant interconnectors in Australia is perceived to have 
confirmed this negative view – to have shown that involvement of merchant investment 
is indeed problematic, and in particular has prevented or delayed efficient regulated 
investment. 
 
The problems and costs of integrating merchant transmission into an existing regulated 
network should not be underestimated, but neither should they be overestimated.121 
However, this paper is not a plea for any particular mix of merchant and regulated 
transmission. My concern here is with the representation in economic analysis of the 
natures of merchant and regulated investment. Focusing on interconnectors - a subset of 
transmission investments where the problems of externalities and transactions costs are 
minimal (though not non-existent) - enables a clearer perception of the nature of 
merchant and regulated investment per se. 
 
My argument is that the implicit characterisation of merchant and regulated investment in 
some of the economic literature is at variance with reality. This was certainly the case 
with the two Australian interconnectors studied, and there is no reason to doubt that it is 
the case more generally.  
 
Take first the characterisation and reality of merchant investment. Far from costs and 
technology being given, the merchant interconnector chose a technology that was not 
                                                                                                                                                 
extending capacity and output to greater than OY, possibly to OY*. The proper comparison is between two 
non-optimal points. 
121
 For what it is worth, my impression (e.g. from policy and experience in Argentina and elsewhere) is that 
a greater role for market decision-making in the transmission sector (not necessarily limited to merchant 
transmission per se) could be achieved at reasonable cost if the will to do so is there. But this lies beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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even considered by the incumbent proponent of the regulated interconnector. Far from 
the merchant interconnector being constructed at lower cost, it deliberately chose a 
technology that was more costly, in part to facilitate control and charging. Far from 
ignoring externalities, another part of the reason for adopting the more costly technology 
was to facilitate undergrounding in order to avoid imposing the environmental 
externalities that the conventional overground regulated interconnector would 
undoubtedly have done – which in turn would have precluded or delayed the project. Far 
from restricting output and investment below the efficient level, and exploiting market 
power to make excessive profits, the evidence at present is that the merchant 
interconnector was unprofitable and that output and investment was greater than the 
efficient level (in the sense of maximising the benefits to market participants as a whole).  
 
Now take the characterisation and reality of regulated investment as applied to 
SANI/SNI. Far from the regulatory process operating in an independent, efficient and 
dispassionate way, it has been characterised at various stages by political involvement 
and inadequate economic analysis, and the Victoria Supreme Court identified a 
fundamental legal error. Far from the proposed regulated interconnector SNI constituting 
an efficient solution after the construction of the merchant interconnector, it was an 
uneconomic duplication by that stage, despite having passed the regulatory test and been 
confirmed by the appeals Tribunal. Far from the actions of the merchant interconnector 
delaying an efficient regulated investment, they delayed an inefficient and duplicative 
regulated investment. Far from the proposed regulated interconnector SANI constituting 
an efficient solution before the construction of the merchant interconnector, NEMMCO 
found that it did not pass the consumer benefits test, the main assumptions underlying the 
economic case for it later proved to be invalid, and the ACCC effectively found that it 
would not have passed the regulatory test because the ACCC identified a more economic 
project, compared to which the proposed regulated interconnector represented an 
excessive investment. 
 
A retrospective analysis of alternatives to the merchant interconnector did identify a 
hypothetical regulated interconnector potentially capable of passing the regulatory test. 
However, the regulatory process did not find this alternative at the time, and the market 
process rejected it as unlikely to obtain environmental approval because it was not 
undergrounded. A merchant interconnector may have replaced a regulated interconnector, 
but there is no reason to think that latter would have been more efficient in the 
conventional sense.  
 
Even if the hypothetically most economic alternative had received environmental 
approval and had been built as a merchant interconnector, it would not have been able to 
cover its costs from trading in the market. Quite apart from the ability of merchant and 
regulated interconnectors to compete on an even basis, there remains a question mark 
over the nature of the benefits that a regulated interconnector is deemed to bring, that can 
justify incurring a cost several times higher than the market value of transmitting 
electricity from low price to high price markets. 
 
But if regulation has not unambiguously promoted efficient investment in interconnectors 
as economists conventionally define it, regulation has not been arbitrary. In various ways 
it has responded to pressure to build interconnectors in order to protect or advance the 
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interests of customers in relatively high-priced regions of Australia. And price 
differentials have indeed reduced. How far this is due to the interconnectors, and how far 
to new generation in those regions, is outside the scope of this paper. It is plausible that 
regulated interconnectors did make, or would have made, a contribution. For present 
purposes, the main point is that regulation does not seem to have been driven by the aim 
of maximising aggregate benefits to all market participants, but by the interests of a 
particular – and important – subset of them. 
 
Merchant and regulated decision-making 
 
It might be argued that Austrlian experience with interconnectors simply represents an 
unfortunate example of regulation, but that if the regulatory framework were improved 
then the problem would disappear or at least be much reduced. It is true that the 
Australian national electricity market is as yet in a transitional stage. Not all the State 
governments and electorates have yet accepted the case for change, or come to terms with 
the kind of regulatory framework that a competitive market entails (and the kinds of 
intervention or influence that it precludes). As and when their stance changes, more 
independent regulation might be hoped for. 
 
It is also true that potential improvements in the regulatory framework can be identified 
and are under discussion. Some changes have already been made, though not necessarily 
all for the better.122 The ACCC is again reviewing the regulatory test,123 and energy 
Ministers have indicated some further reforms. The recent judgement by the Victoria 
Supreme Court establishes or clarifies an essential obligation on the regulatory body and 
the incumbent transmission company that was previously missing or not recognised.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be overoptimistic, and missing the point, to expect that regulatory 
reform would solve the problem or remove the necessity for choice between merchant 
and regulated investment. Analyses of such investment need to incorporate the 
fundamental difference between private and public decision-making. This is a difference 
that is well explicated and empirically validated in the literature on public choice and 
economic regulation, but that is so far largely absent from the models of transmission 
investment 
 
To indicate briefly some implications of this difference, the private sector in general, and 
merchant investment in particular, can be expected to seek out and seize new ways of 
meeting the demands of users and customers, wherever these promise to repay the costs 
of doing so. Investors will of course hope to recover more than their costs if the 
opportunity presents itself, but this opportunity is limited by the actions of competitors 
and the threat of further technical change – and, significantly, by the willingness to pay of 
their potential customers. At the time of decision-making, all these things are unknown. 
Merchant investments may turn out to be unprofitable because they misjudge what the 
market will bear. To the extent that investments are not profitable, the shareholders rather 
than customers suffer the consequences – indeed, customers typically benefit from the 
additional investment. For that reason merchant investors can be expected to take steps to 
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 C.f. Mountain and Swier 2003 
123
 E.g. Discussion paper Review of the regulatory test, ACCC, 5 February 2003.  
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limit the drain on resources as soon as it becomes apparent, and to try to avoid such 
mistakes in future. 
 
The public sector in general, and regulated investment in particular, are characterised by 
different goals and constraints. Public sector proponents of regulated investment can be 
expected to seek out and adopt new ways of meeting the demands of those to whom they 
feel answerable. These may include governments, politicians, regulators, the management 
of the incumbent transmission company, potential entrants into transmission, generators 
in different regions, customer groups, employees, suppliers, investment analysts, the 
media, and so on. The precise weighting of these influences is difficult to specify, and 
varies over time. However, the views of government are surely influential, and the better 
organised and better-financed interest groups tend to have more influence than the less 
organised and less-financed ones. Of course, private sector proponents may be expected 
to use regulated investment to further their own ends of greater profitability. 
 
The need to cover the cost of a regulated investment from the potential beneficiaries is 
not a constraint, since the cost is to be spread over users generally, at a level that is 
unlikely to excite adverse comment. Consequently the need to assess in advance what the 
market will bear is much reduced. So, too, is the need to monitor subsequent costs, 
revenues and benefits associated with this investment. Customers or the taxpayer bear the 
consequences of any decision. For this reason, at least, there is a regulatory process for 
examining and approving the project in the first place, which in principle involves all the 
potentially interested parties. By its nature this process is liable to be prolonged and 
costly, because this is where and how the interest groups compete. 
 
With regulated investment there is less if any pressure to take remedial action in the event 
of misjudging costs and demands, and less if any pressure to avoid repeating mistakes in 
future. Indeed, what might be perceived as a mistake from a market or economic 
standpoint is not necessarily a mistake from the perspective of the interest groups that 
seek to advance a regulated investment. Consequently, there may be no pressure to avoid 
it and every pressure to continue.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The first part of this paper has reviewed the decision of the Victoria Supreme Court. That 
decision effectively established that the regulatory authorities in Australia (NEMMCO 
and the Electricity Tribunal) erred in finding that SNI as a duplicate interconnector would 
pass the regulatory test. Duplicate SNI can no longer be argued to be an economic 
proposition. The decision has also clarified and strengthened the obligations on an 
incumbent transmission company in a competitive electricity market. 
 
Second, this paper has examined the history of the previous interconnectors between 
South Australia and Victoria/NSW. Neither SANI that was proposed as a regulated 
interconnector before SNI, nor the merchant interconnector Murraylink, would have 
passed the regulatory test as subsequently carried out by the ACCC. And neither of these 
two interconnectors, nor the most economic interconnector project (Alternative 3) 
identified by the ACCC, would have been financially viable based on trading in the 
market. 
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Third, the merchant and regulated interconnectors into Queensland have not covered their 
costs based on trading.124 Indeed, some commentators have supported regulated 
interconnectors precisely because they do not require the price differentials that merchant 
interconnectors need. Building regulated interconnectors to the capacity necessary to 
remove or substantially to reduce price differentials is not economically efficient in the 
sense of maximising the sum of consumer and producer benefits. However, under 
plausible circumstances, the resulting narrowing of price differentials is likely to reduce 
many electricity prices (prices said to be unreasonably high), and thereby redistribute 
income in favour of electricity consumers and away from producers, even though the 
revised regulatory test requires regulated interconnectors to maximise total market 
benefits. Application of the regulatory test has not looked at price differentials obtaining 
in the forward markets, hence has not questioned why (for example) the energy and 
capacity benefits attributed to an interconnector are apparently above those prospectively 
obtaining in the markets. 
 
The economic literature and some of the practical debate has focused on the question 
whether merchant or regulated interconnectors are more likely to maximise the aggregate 
net benefits to electricity market participants. Experience with Australian interconnectors 
– the way the regulatory framework is set up and the way the process actually operates – 
raises a more fundamental question. Is a regulatory framework really intended, or ever 
likely, to identify and build those interconnectors most likely to maximise the net benefits 
to all market participants? Or is it geared to achieving other ends, however laudable they 
may or may not be? 
 
The ultimate conclusion of this paper is that regulating transmission investment is not 
simply a way of achieving the same ends as merchant investment without some of the 
biases and costs and market failures that merchant investment is alleged to involve. 
Rather, it is a way of substituting a quite different set of objectives and constraints for 
those determined by the market. It is a way of ensuring that other objectives are pursued 
instead of market objectives (or instead of perceived monopoly market objectives). 
Indeed, as the regulated framework with respect to interconnectors in Australia has 
developed over time, and as some would like to see it develop in future, it is scarcely an 
exaggeration to say that its purpose is not to ensure that regulated interconnectors are 
built if and only they are economic in the conventional sense, but precisely to ensure that 
they are built despite not being economic. The choice between merchant and regulated 
investment is thus not a choice between different ways of getting to the same destination. 
It is a choice between different destinations. 
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Figure 2 SNI and Murraylink showing Unbundled SNI  
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